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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
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To Members of the Committee on the 
Judiciary:
During the 84th Congress, a number of replies were received to a
questionnaire on Presidential Inability which had been distributed to
numerous jurists, political scientists, and public officials. In addi-
tion, the subcommittee held a hearing on various proposals which
had been submitted to it on the different aspects of the problem of
presidential inability. I have laid the Legislative Reference Service
of the Library of Congress prepare an analysis of tile material and
testimony contained in House committee print "Presidential In-
ability," Counittee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives,
January 31, 1956, and the hearings on" Presidential Inability held on
April 1"1 and 12, 1956, before a Special Subcommittee, Serial No. 20,
84th Congress, 2d session.
I hope that you will find this analysis informative and useful. It
does not contain any conclusions on tile part of members of tile
subcommittee.
EMANUEL CELLER, chairman .
Tim LIBRARY Or CONGRESS,
LEGISLATIVE REFERlENCE SERVICE,
Washington, D. C., February 11, 1957.
MEMORANDUM
To: Representative Emanuel Celler
From: Dorothy Schaffter, Senior Specialist in American Government
Subject: Analysis of (1) House ('omnittee Print "Presidential In-
ability," (onmnittee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives,
January 31, 1956. 74 pages and (2) "Presidentimd imbility,"
hearings before Special Subcommittee to Study Presidential
Inability of the Committee on the Judiciary. llouse of Rep-
resentatives. 84th Congress, 2d session, on Problem of Presi-
denlial lIability. April 11 and 12, 1956. Serial No. 20. 124
pages. This analysis was discussed by the l)irector of Lcgislative
Reference Service aml 'Mrs. Bess E. 1)ick, staff director of the
committee in December 1956, and a deadline of early in the 1957
session was set.
Two members of the Legislative Reference Service staff )r. Dorothy
Sehaffter, senior specialist in American Govermnent and hor reseairci
assistant, Miss Dorothy M. Mathews, were assigned to prepare this
report.
After consideration of several forms of presenting such an analysis,
it appeared that Ihe most usehlu would be to bse it on the question-
naire which tile Committee on the Judieiarv had sent to numerous
emilivilt jurists, political scientists, and public officials. Seventeen
Ill
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replies to this questionnlaire'were included in the committee 
print of
January 3 1, 1956, and tile replies of four more persons were 
published
in the hearings of April 11 and 12, 1956. At tile hearings 6 persons
who had previously submitted replies testified, ad5 plroiis who
had not submittedI replies appeared as witnesses. A total 
of 20
person either replied to the euostionlnihO or discussed 
the principal
questions ill it,.
The information and tie expressions of judlg iellt of these 26 author-
ities constitute a most valuable source for the use of 
Members of
Congress and all interested citizens. Presentation in the 
form con-
tained in the committee print aud the published hearings, however,
makes it almost, impossible for one to determine the answers 
of all the
authorities to any 1 of the 11 questions in the questionnaire. 
The
attached summary prepared by Legislative Reference Service 
remedie,'
this difficulty. In the eleven sections of tle report. very brief 
state-
.ents of theviews of each authority are preceded by a brief 
summary.
Page references to the committee print (1) and to the leanings (l)
are included in tile individual statement to enallble the reader 
to get
the brief quoted statement in its context.
Following the analysis is a copy of the text of the questionnaire.
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
An analysis of replies to a questionnaire of tile Committee on tile
Judiciary, House of Representatives, contained in their committee
print of January 31, 1956; and of testimony of witnesses at hearings
of the committee's special subcommittee to study presidential inability,
held on April 11 and 12, 1956.
[See preceding memorandum of February 11, 1957, for explanation
of materials used and form of analysis.)DOROTHY SCUAFFTER,
Senior Specialist in American Government.
DOROTHY NI. MIATHEWS,
Research Assistant in American Government.
February 11, 1957.
1. (a) What was intended by the term "inability" as used in article 2,
section 1, clause 6, of the Constitution?
I1,ss than half the persons who answered the questionnaires or who
aIlpearedl before the Committee expressed an opinion concerning the
intended meaning of the term 'inability." A number of these pretaced
t heir remarks with expressions of doubt concerning the meaning of the.
term as intended b1 thke drafters of the Constitution. A few expressed
a belief that the failure to further define "inability" in the Constitution
had been deliberate, in order that cases might l)e decided in tile future
in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time. A number said
franaldv that they did not know what the intended meaning of "in-
abilit," was or hiaal been. The remainder did not answer the question
or express an opinion on the matter. -
Although various concepts were included in the several statements
concerning the intended meaning of inability, the central them and
tile concepts upon which a. number of those who replied agreed, ap-
l)eared to be as follows: (1) Inability might be either of a temporary
or permanent nature; (2) inability and disability as used in the clause
are synonymous; (3) inability covers every instance in which a Presi-
dent'is unable, for any reason, to discharge the powers and duties of
his office.
A summary of the replies to the questionnaire and of comments
made in testimony at hearings on the subject is given below, under
the following headings:
A. Expressions of opinion concerning the intended meaning of
"inability".
B. Replies expressing belief that failure to define "inability"
was deliberate.
C. Replies indicating opinion that the definition of "inability"
is not known.
D. Replies in which there was no answer to the question.
1
A. EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION CONCERNING THE INTENDED MEANING OF(I INABILITY"1
Aikin (111 19-21): [Aikin regarded the "inability" of a President to
Irfoinit he burdens of his 
office which have been brought, 
about
lte demandsof modern Government, and 
because of which
congress has set. up staff aids for the President, as a part of the
"inability" referred to in article 2, section 1, clause 6 of the
Constitution. Ile did not, however, offer a comprehetisive
statement oii the intended meaning of the term.]
Brown -(P.13): "There is an abundance of conflicting opinion oil 
thle
of t erm but none is authoritatve. the recor
the Fed(eral Convention and the commentators on the Constitu-
tion throw no light on the question. Since there are no author-
ities to whon one can turn for a definition of 'inability', the term
must be defined on the bases of general principles of law 
and rules
governing constitutional interpretation."
Crosskey (11106): "The term 'inability,' * * * is general: it covers
every instance in which a President is unable, for any reason
whatsoever, 'to (ischlarge the Powers and Duties of [its] Office';
or, I should suppose. any important part of them. * * 
* Cases
of temporary '-Inability, as well as iwrnlianent 'Inability', 
inust
* * * have'been intended to be covered, andi the language 
of
the Constitution is fully~ adequate to cover. theta.''
Fairman (P18): " Ive not undertaken extended research to uncover
what may have been said about the construction 
of 'inability'
in tIle col'1st, of our constit utionial de\v'lol)nient. I(ldoubt whether
such research would lend much aid to understanding. 
Here tile
questionn is not of finding the meaning in 1787 of some 
old term
of law, but rather of applying the constitutional 
provision in
any future eventuality. 'Ihe words, it sees to me. apth" express
the essential thought- the difficulty lies rather in t lie application.
It: is sinabilitv to (is.arge tle 'Nowers' and 'duties' of 
th0
office': these words contelate a .a. s . ,ein 
the
itnutubelit, has bccone utlible effectively to discharge 
the task$
a President mwust discharge. * * * "
I (a) -4
Fellinia (P23): "I do not knowv what tile authors of Ihe Constitution
i-itended byv the termi 'inability,' except that they obviously, 
In-
tended to have the Vice President ser,,e as Ating 
Presidnte
dimring a period of Presidential disability. Disability 
was never
defitmed, and% was mentioned only once ill the 
debates of the
Conist itultionial Convention * *"
Hatrt (1):30): ''The termi 'inability' is clarifiedI by kihe later ulse 
inl the
same clause of the term 'disability' as a synonyin. 
The reason-
able meaning is clear in general; 
* * *It
Ila"t (1192): "* * * the terms 'inability' and '(1sability 
are ili this
context synonymou *, * * inability memns inability 
from what-
evt, cause, aid hence itcludes everythilig 
from physical or
mental inability to capture by a public enemy; * * 
* therefore
the Scope of imibi"ity is the same as time scope of section 
2 of the
British Regency Act of 1937 as quotedd by .Mr. Fellmanl; t
absence from the country does not in itsel constitute inability,
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and would not ordinarily do so in fact, but might conceivably
produce consequences which constituted de facto inability."
Kallenbach (P44): "The term 'inability' as used in article II, section '
1, clause 6 of the Con'stitution was intended to cover any con-
tingency which might render the President incapable of intelli-
gently, responsibly, and effectively discharging the powers and
duties of his office. WVhether absence of the President from the
seat of government or his leaving the territory of the United
States were meant to be covered by the term 'inability' is debat-
able; but precedent and usage have established that tlhese circum-
stances (10 not, in themselves, give rise to an inability requiring
devolution of executive power, and duties upon the succeeding
officer. * * * It is conceivable, however, that a circumstance
may arise in which the fact, that the President is 1 uder a com-
pulsion for some reason or other to be absent from the seat of
government for an indefinitely long period of time may be a
factor to be weighed in making a determination on whether he is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office."
Kallenbacl (H84-91): [Testimony contains no additional information
on this point.]
Peltason (P48-49): "The framers left us no clue as to how they in-
tended the word ['inability'] to be interprete(l and no Federal
court has had occasion todefine it. * * * The dictionary (is-
tinguishes inability from disability by saying that the former
,suggests inherent lack "f power to) performi something' and the
latter 'now commonly impIes some loss of nie(ecd competency or
qualifications.' But when tile framers substituted inability for
disabilityy in later drafts of tile Constitution, they di( so0 for
stylistic reasons and * * * intended no substantive change."
Pennock (P52): "I doubt if the franers of the Constitution "hadt( a
precisely formulated definition of tihe word 'inability' in mind,
although I should have thought that there was little, doubt that
they meant to include mental as well as physical disalbility.'
Peters (11122): "The term 'inability' as used il article 2, section 1,
clause 6, of the Constitution was intended in all likelihood to
mean a condition of time, place, or circumstance whereby the
President became unable to discharge the duties laid upon him
by the terms of the Constitution.
Pritcl;ett, (l52): [Question not answered directly. Pritchett's open-
ing statement referred to] "The present uncertainty as to the
meaning of the term 'inability' as applied to tie President in
article II, section 1 of the Constitution. * * *"
Pritchett (1170): "It seems obvioLIs that inability must be interpreted
)roadly enough to guarantee that the Vice Presidentwill be able
to act when an emergency requires action and the President is for
whatever reason unable to act. The present language of clau
6 should need no elaboration to make this point clear."
Romani (P55-56): "It appears reasonably clear from a reading of the
section of the Constitution in point, and the debates in the 1787
Convention, that the term, inabilityy', comprehends both tem-
porary and permanent inability, on the part of the President to
(schiiarge the duties and functions of his office."
Romani (H40-46): [No additional information was presented in his
testimony.]
3
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B. REPLIES EXPRESSING BELIEF THAT 
FAILURE TO DEFINE "INABILITY"
WAS DELIBERATE
Finletter (P27): "I believe that the Philadelphia Convention deliber-
ately did not define the word 'inability.' "File quality of thle
debates in the Convention was so high that I cannot believe it
was all oversilit. that they failed to be more specific than they
were. Indee even in hindsight . . . it, seems to me wise not
to attempt a definition."
Iolcombe (P33) : "[le omission of a definition of the term 'inability,'
as used in article II, section 1, clause 6, was deliberate. The
framers, conscious of their inability to anticipate all the different
circumstances in which the President might be unable to perform
the duties of his office, intended that each case should be decided
as it' might arise in the light of reason."
REPIA.PS INDICATING OPINION THAT TIlE DEFINITION OF "INABIlATY' 
IS
NOT KNOWN
Bailey (P4): 'I (1o not know, and I am not sure that anyone knows,
.hat, the Founding Fathers really meant by the tern 'inability.'
Frelighuysen (1118-40) : [Question not directly answered.. i Hs sti-
mony revealed a belief that, 'amnbiguit ies surrounding Presidential
disability" should l)e clarified.i
Howe (I'35): [Question not directly answered, but Howe referred to
the "vagueness of the constitutional provision" (concerning
inability.)]
Ilnn (1147): [Question not directly answered, but Hvman referred
tol "a constitutional ambiguity on the question o'f disability as
it has stood for the last 169 yars".
P~ayne. (1112): "While theo question of julst, whaft Was mleanit by 'in-
ability' was raised tt the Constitutional Covntion, it, was
givenl very little attention and 110 coudlusions were leachied."
Suitherland (l'61): "I (10 uot know of any material which shows us
just. what thet draftsilen haid ill mind, and it, mafy be that thle
absence from the Constitution of anv machinery for superseding
the President in case of inability iiidicates that comparatively
little thought was given to the matter."
Sutherland (1177-84): [No further information in testimony.]
Corwiu (P116): [Question not directly answered.]
D. REPLIES IN WHICH THERE WAS NO ANSWER TO THE QUESTION
Herbert Hoover (1'35, 111-2): [Question not directly answered.]
H1u ber (P3,6-37): [Question wvas not answered.]
Krock (1161-68): [Question was not discussed.]
Iien (11123): [Question not directly answered.1
Sparkman (118-12): [Question was not discussed.]
I (b)
I (b) Shall a definition. [qf "inability"] be enacted into law?
A very large majority of the replies were in the negative, as in vari-
ous avas thle view was expressed that a definition of "inability should
not be enacted into law. Such action 
was termed "undesirable,"
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"unwise," "unnecessary," "inadvisable," and considered of doubtful
value.
Among the reasons given in support of the negative replies were the
following:
(1) Aln attempt to define in specific terms types of situations
in an area where every case is apt to be sui generis might cause
trouble by failing to anticipate a future situation.
(2) An attempt to define the term in general terms would not
I)rovide any more of a guide than common understanding now
urnishes.
(3) The present text accurately expresses the constitutional
concept.
(4) Any attempt to define the term would serve to narrow this
important provision of the Constituion; to do this by legislation
would be unconstitutional.
Only five replies favored the enactment of a definition of "inability"
into law. In the remainder of replies there was no answer to t'ho
question.
A summary of the replies to the questionnaire and of comments
made in testiinony at hearings on the subject, is presented below, under
the following headings:
A. Expressions of opinion that a definition of "inability" should
not be enacted into law.
13. Replies which favored enactment of a (ehuition of "inabil-
ity" into law.
C. Replies in which there was no answer to the question.
A. EXPIRESSIONS OF OPINION THAT A DEFINITION 
OF "INAMIIATY'p
SHOULD NOT BE ENACTED INTO JAW
Aikin (-1121): "* * * it would be unnecessary * * * to spell out
the meaning of the term 'inability' with precision [if tihe joint.
resolution which Aikin suggested 'were adopted, for] it is to be
expected that aii adequate definitionn of the term would grow out
of statesmanlike actions of the Congress. Were the word given
a narrowly conceived meaning in any single enactment, that
meaning might well resolve the problems of the past whih'
failing to meet the unpred ictable olis of the future".
Bailey (1'4) : "I doubt that a definition should be enacted into law."
Corwin (1"16): "Oin account of the variety of human circumstances
capable of affecting such a question, I greatly doubt tile pos-
sibility of framing a sure-fire definition of Presilential 'inahihtv'.
In fact, such a definition might. easily operate to embarrass
determination of the matter in many actual situations."
Crosskey (11100): [In view of the] "generality of the 'Presidential
inability' provision of the Constitution, nid the wisdom of its
having been cast by the framers in these general terms, * * *
I (to not think Conigress should attempt to define Presidential
'Inability,' either in respect to its causes or in respect to its
duration. To define the conception would be to narrow this
important provision of the Constitution. This would be unwise.
It would aso, as an act of Congress, be unconstitutional; for
Congress has no power to alter this or any other provision of the
89950-57--2
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Constitution, unless power to do so be given in specific terms, as
in this case, it clearly is not."
Fairman (1P18): "I urge that no attempt be made to enact a definition
[of inability] into law. The text accurately expresses the consti-
tutional concept. It is not, for Congress to enlarge or to con-
tract-and in any event the Constitution's own words would
remain the test. *It is for Congress to provide the means for
ascertaining inability in any doubtful case."
I (b)-3
Felhnan (P23): "I think it would be extremely unwise to try to
define the term 'inability' in legislation. Any attempted defini-
tion would, I believe, do more harm than good, and the more
lprolix the definition, the worse it, would be. * * *"
Finletter (P27): "~ * * I recommend against a definition being
enacted into law. Disability is a relative term. There are, of
course, rare cases where there is no doubt that a man is disabled
and in every likelihood will continue to be disabled. * * * In
that case a congressional definition of the term 'inability' would
add nothing. rihe more usual case, however, would be where
there would be doubt whether the President (a) was at the time
incapable of performing his duties, or (b) might recover from
the inability; and there are so niany variations within these two
possibilities, as well as so many possible variations of circum-
stances and of personality, that I believe it would be unwise to
try to cover all the possible situations by a written definition."
Hart (P30): ''The reasonable meaning [of 'inability'] is clear in gen-
eral; and it may be doubted whether a definitionn should be spelled
out in the statute. The attempt to define in specific terms types
of situations in an area where every case is apt to be sui generic
might cause trouble I)y failing to anticil)ate some future situation.
On the other hand, any general language vould probably have
to be so very general as not to be more of a guide than common
un(lerstandinig now is. An agency such as that proposed below
should have the opportunity to'use its own best judgment un-
ham ered by the words of a legislative definition and guided only
by t e general intent of the Constitution. The same objection
arises with respect to writing a definition of the duration of an
inability."
Hart (1192): "* * * while Congress should not undertake a definition
of inability, the joint resolution [which Hart proposed] * * *
should declare * * * that inability includes 'all cases in which
the President is in fact, unable to exercise the powers and discharge
the duties of his office'."
Hlolcombe (P33): "* * * in my opinion, it is not desirable that a
mmore precise definition of 'inability' be enacted into law. I believe
that the framers showed sound judgment in refusing to try to
anticipate all the contingencies that might, arise in a distant and
uncertain future. We should not be improving their work but
impairing it if we should undertake to (to what they so wisely
refused to attempt."
Howe (P35): "* * * the unpredictable contingencies of the future
* * * leads me to believe that it would be most unfortunate to
14
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attempt by any means to define 'inability'. It seems to me that
it is better to preserve the vagueness of thte constitutional provi-
sion than to attempt to achieve an undesirable, and perhaps all
unattainable, precision. It seems to me, for instance, that an
'inability' which might present major problems if it should occur
at the beginning of a President's term of office might involve' no
truly significant issues for the Government if it should arise during
the concluding months of his administration. To produce a
single definition and to seek a single answer for problems which
the accidents of time make essentially different would seem to tie
most unfortunate".
Ilyman (H54): [Question was not directly answered. However, in(iscussing a proposed joint resolution Mr. Hyman remarked]
"* * * the drafters of the joint resolution showed genius in not
venturing to define the term 'inability' or how many degrees of
it would have to prevail before the substantive provisions of the
resolution would become operative. Had they acted otherwise,
all that would have become operative would be 'a Babel of political
and legal persons tossing bricks at each other that were meant
for use in building a tower reaching to a constitutional heaven."
Payne (1115): [The question was not directly answered. However,
Payne did states "* * * ( o not believe that Congress should
in any way play an active part in determining Presidential in-
abilit,.''
Peltason ('49): "Any attempt to define inability would be unwise.
Inability is more than a condition, it is a judgment. It is ajudgment that cannot be made ill advance. It depeu(ds upon
the particular demands at the particular time. Under some
conditions, piemunonia might render the President. unable to(lischarge his duties. At, other times, the demands might not
be so pressing; a delay in Presidential action might, not result
in a failure to disclarge his responsibilities. Inability is as
precise as iny word that might be chosen, * * *"
Pennock (I'52): "I doubt very much whether it would be desirablee to
attempt to enact a (efinition into law." [Tie definition of
'inability' "is a matter that should be left to the discretion of
whatever agency is charged with the determination of 'ilbility'."
Prichett (P52): "I would recommend against such an effort, Ithe
enactment of a dle'finition of 'inability' into law] on the grounds
that it. would l)e impossible to develop anything except a collec-
tion of truisms having no real value in arriving at, a finding of
inability."
Pritchett (1170): "* * * should a legislative definition of 'inability'
be adopted? I doubt the necessity' or wisdom of such ani
attempt."
Romnani (1P57): [The approach, that Congress might undertake a
definition of the term "inability," and enact such a definition
into law,] "seems unwise, not lnly because it, is somewhat ui-
necessary, but also because it is impossible to work out a defini-
tiun that would cover tiny and all contingencies. The existence
of an inability statute would tend to confuse tile issue when a
case of Presidential inability arose not mentioned in the law,
thereby creating delay, rather than promptness, in meeting tile
situation. Such a law, also, is no guaranty that, the procedures
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desi lned to deal With the question would lie sufficiently flexible
for tis purpose. ,Moreover, any effort to lelne 'inability' would,
no doubt, lead to a consideration of whether absence from tile
seat of government constituted inability, thus opening another
Pandora's box. For these reasons, it is strongly recommended
that Congress not attempt a definition of the term, 'inability,'
as it appears in arti(le 2, section 1, clause 6 of the Constitution."
Romani (1143): "* * * any attempt to define inability would telnld
to create almost as Maty diffiCultics as the ones we are trying to
lleet."
Sparkman (119): "I think it woidd be most mnvise to try to enact a
definition for inability. When I consider hbow vastly different
are the demands of the Office of Presidenht today from .ant they
were 150 years ago--even 50 years ago- -1 have serious doul)ts
that any defimtion would have much permamnt value.''
Suleriland (P61):' "I should consider an attempt tit legislative (lefi-
iitioli inadvisable and not helpful. The varieties and legrecs
of disability, physical and mental, temporary or permanent,
wl iich might render a President u able to (liseharge his duties,
are so unilerous that ati iinventorv woultli be impracticable, and
a definition would end up as a repetition in different words of
what we already know- -t hat inability in the constitutional sense
is inability so serious that it requires that tile President's duties
Ibe taken, over by Someone elSe."
Suthiedand (1178-79): "I agree that it is futile to attellhpt any such
(helilitio, [of inaiiity. Everything from hostile capture to
netAl disturaIce is a possibilitv, and there is no practical way
to define these niny forms of inhtiility ill a few words."
1. iIEIA'1S 1V ltl..vomi.)V.D .XCTMENT OF A DEINITION OF INAlii.I-fv
INTO LA.W
iro\ n ('5): "A dei nition of 'inability' should Ie, enacted into law."
Freliucg;1i yscn (1133 and 3S): " * * it - ould be very undesirable
it) t6 to spell out * * * [a definition of 'inability'] im a colisti-toltio'nl at nc nhllnt." [[lomv\e\'r, ill tile joint t'tsoltltion whlich
Mr. Frelilghuiysel piresi llted] "'e action V provides that 'tile
Congress nav ibv law implement the foregoing sections of this
nrtide.' 'rl ie purpose here is to enalde the Congierss, should it,
see fit, to attelpt fNrther to deilie 'inability' and to establish
additional and more detailed procedures for determinioig il-
ability. * * *"
Kallenhaih (P44): "1 think that a eongressio)Iil statute, ini the form of
a joint resolution e.,ibraliiig the t.ssellce of the constitutioial
terminology relative to devo1ition of presidential power ill the
event of presidential disability and expressive of the sense of
Congress, should be enacted."
Kallenbach (1190): "1 suggest that there Ibe inclded ill the constitu-
tional aliendment [which Kallenbach proposed a guide as to what
inability, is.''
Lien (11123): [Questiomi not (directly anlsivered. 13y imlupicationi tlio
ieply appeared to favor a dejiitioli of "'inability.''
Peters (11122): '"A clarifying definition should be eniactedl into law.''
7
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C. REPLIES IN WHICH THERE WAS NO ANSWER TO THE QUESTION
ioover (P35, 11-2): lQuestion was not answered.]
Iluber (P36-37): [Question was not answered.]
Krock (H61-68): [Question was not, discussed.]
I (c) If so, [if you faror the enactmeiet of a definition of inabilityy" into
law] will you set.forth a workable definition?
I (d) Shall such a definition encompass physical and mental disabdity
a.s wdll as the duration thereqf?
Since these two questions are linked to question I (b) above, the
only substlanlivC teJ)lies to be expected ar- from. those W1ho favored tire
emaitment of a definition of "inability" into law. However, a few
)ersonis who did not frv'or enactment of a definition did indicate what
such a definition might contain.
All replies from both of these groups are sumirIarized below.
SUBSTAN.1VE COMMENTS CONCEJINING A DEFINITION OF "4INABILiTYit
Brown (P5 arid 14): "Such a law should provide for bolh p)hysical
and mental disability, permanent and tempor'ar,. Temporary
absence from the country is not necessarily an 'inability'; how-
ever, th(, capture of a President in time ofwar could readily lead
to a crisis in Goverinent unless proper provisions were made for
such an emergency . Even if it possesses tlie power Con-
gress probably canrit define inability before its occurrence in
sucb a way as to eover (,very ('oitgiiry. The mrost Congress
cair do is to declare that the terin 'inability' siall cover all c-ases
in which thIe President is iii fasit unable to exercise tie powers and
discharge tie duties of his office."
Fellinan (P23): [Although Felinarn did not think the term should be
detilred by legislation if nevertheless this is attempted, lie stated
that] " . . . commosese dictates that disability may be due
either to bodily or mental infirmity, arld if there is any possible
doubt abont ii, then the law should say as much. . .. Clearly
the Constitution contemplates that tire President may get, over
Iris disability, since it uses the phrase 'until the disability is
iemroved.' bviom4yl a sick rnon may get vell, artid tie'law
should be clear on this point, tlat the" President resumes all of
his powers wl Ii,is disability is ended."
Hart (1130): [In a tnetiroiarnduii oil Presidential inability, iart
doubte(d vIetlher a definition should be spelh, d out, in a statute.]
Iart (1192): [\Whrn ie testified before tire Committee, lort sicte(l,]t.. .while Congress should irot undertake a definition of
inability, the joint resolution [which ire proposed] . . . should
I elare... tit irrability includes 'all cases ill which tire
President is in fact unable to exercise the powers and diseirarge
the duties of hi. office'."
Kallenbachi (P44-45): [The statute "should define presidential in-
ability, but only iii tire broadest terms. Any definition more or
less restrictive than the language of tire Constitution itself is
beypud the power of Corrgress to enact. hence tie statute should
merely express congressional accord with the constit itional rule
that tlere shall be a devolution of presidential power upon the
Vice President, or any other officer properly in the line of the
succession, in the event of an inability of the President. 'Ia-
biliy,' in the constitutional sense, has reference to a mental or
physical condition or any other condition, which prevents the
aciual exercise of the powers and duties of the office of President
as the public interest and necessities require. * * * 'Inability is
a matter of fact. It is my belief that Congress lacks authoity
to circumscribe in any way the term as it is found in this clause
of the Constitution. It may not delimit the causes from which
inability may be deemed to arise, or prescribe a period of time
during which the inability must persist before the devolution of
presidential power may occur. Nor may it specify a minimum
or maximum period of time during which the devolution of presi-
dential power shall be deemed effective. The Constitution indi-
cates that it shall be effective for the duration of the period of
actual inability of the President, and Congress cannot alter the
constitutional rule on this point."
Kallenbach (1190): (A guide to what inability is] "would be covered
in the following section of the amendment (which he proposed]:
"Sec. 2. If the President should, for any reason become unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office in tie manner which
the public interest requires and necessitates, the powers and duties
of tie office shall devolve upon tile Vice President, who shall then
act as President until the disability be removed or his term 
of
office shall expire. Congress may by law establish the procedure
by which the inability of the President to discharge the powers
and duties of his office shall be determied, and provide for the
case of the removal, death, resignation, or inability both of the
President and Vrice President, declaring what officer shall then
act as President; and such officer shall act accordingly, until the
disability be removed, or a Presid6nt shall 
be elected."
Lien (11123): "It seems to be agreed by all that the wording of any
provision relating to 'inability' should be general enough to cover
the unavailabilitv of tile Pi'esident for the performance of 
his
duties whatever the cause involved might be-mental or physical
illnies, airplane crash in some inaccessible place, kidnaping,
wartime capture, etc." 
p
Peters (1[122): "The law should provide that 'inabiity'also includes
both mental and physical disability and that 'inability' also 
in-
cludes circumstances under which the President is captured,
imprisoned, or similarly impeded in tile discharge of his constitu-tiol functions. A Wiiod of time would not have to be specified
in the definition. Briief periods of inability would appear to come
within the rule of do inuinnis.'
Pritchett (P52): [In his reply to the questionnaire, Pritchett recom-
nlCnldel against enacting a definition of inability into law.]
Pritchett (1170): [li a prepared statement presented at the hearings,
Pritchett doubted the "necessity or wisdom" of adopting 
a legis-
lative defiitio. of "inability". His statement continued:l
"However, if there is a desire to make it clear beyond the shadow
of a doubt, Congress might, as suggested by Ruth C. Silva 
. . .
pass a concurrent resolution declaring that inability covers 
any
situation which restrains a President front the actual exercise 
of
his powers at a time when the public interest requires the exercise
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of those powers. 'In this form it would he without legal effect,
but would be a guide which might prove useful in a situation
where inability might need to be determined. However, thereis certainly no case for putting such a statement in the Constitu-
tion itself by way of amendment."
II. Who shall initiate the question of the President'8 inability to discharge
the powers and duties of his office?
(a) The Congress.(b) The Vice President.
(e) The Cabinet by majority vote.(d) Any other group, including independent agencies.(e) Shall (d) be of a continuing or temporary nature?
Perhaps the most remarkable characteristic of the replies to this
question is the wide variety of proposals which they contained. A
second characteristic is the disregardof the form of reply as indicated
in the subsections of question 11. In only a few cases did replies
follow that form, and the large majority were in essay-type general
discussions. Finally, there was considerable overlap in the replies to
questions II and III, making it difficult in several instances to de-
termine whether the act of initiation (question II) was or was not
exercised by the same person or agency performing the act of de-
termination (question III).
(A) THE CONGRESS
This agency of initiation was proposed by only five persons, one of
whom made special provision for a smaller group'to act if Congress was
not in session. Other persons proposed action by either Congress
or the Cabinet (F (1) below); by either the Vice President, or the
Cabinet, or the Congress (F (2) below); and by either the Vice Presi-
dent, or Congress, and a special body (F (5) below).
S. THE VICE PRESIDENT
Six persons propose(l that the Vice President alone initiate action,
and two others proposed his initiating action after purely advisory
notice from the Cabinet or Congress, or from the Cabinet or some
member of the President's staff. In oiie of the six cases above, the
person first pro.oecd initiation by the Cabinet (in his reply to the
questionnaire), but changed his recommendation to initiationl by the
Vice President, after securing the advii.e of the Cabinet (in his testi-
mony at tile hearings). Two personss proposed that the power of
initiation be given to either the Vice President or the Cabinet or
Congress (F (2) below); one proposed the Vice President and tile
Cabinet (F (3) below); one proposed either the Vice President or a
special body F (4) below) and one proposed either the Vice President
or Congress, and a special body (F (5) below).
C. THE CABINET
President Hoover (lid not answer this question directly but, by
implication, lie approved initiation by the Cabinet. Ile dia not state
whether Cabinet action should be by majority vote. One other per-
son (Pritchett) advocated this method (in his reply to the queston-
M
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uaire), but changed his recommendation to initiation by the Vice
President, after securing tile advice of the Cabinet (in his testimony
at the hearing). (See B, above.) A third person (Sutherland) pro-
posed initiation by the Cabinet (in his reply to the questionnaire),
bUt changed his recommendation to initiation by a special body (in
his testimony at the hearing) (1), below). Oth er persons proposed
action by the Cabinet and the Vice President (F (3) below); by Con-
gress or the Cabinet (F (1) below); and by the Vice President, or Con-
gress, or the Cabinet (F (2) below).
(D) ANY OTHER GROUP, INCLUDING INDEPENDENT AGENCIES; AND
(U) SHALL (D) BE OF A CONTINUING O1 TkMPORARY NATURE?
Five persons (one of whom had proposed initiation by the Cabinet
in his reply to the questionnaire, but who changed his proposal in his
test mony at the hearings) l)roposed that the power of initiation be
given to (1) a special continuing committee with membership as pro-
'ided Iby statute; (2) a permanent commission of civilians appointed
by the upreme Court; or (3) a council consisting of members of the
(abinet and (1ongressional leaders. A sixth person suggested either
the Vice President, or niy body created by Congress for the purpose
of determining disability (.F (i) below). A seventh person recoil-
mended joint action bwv either the Vice President or ( congress , an( a
special body consisting of members of the ( 'ahinet and (Congressional
leaders (se: F (5) blow).
(F) NOMINATIONSS OF TIlE CONGIIESS, THE VICE PRESIDENT, THE
CA IIN'T, Ol A SPECI.I, COMMISSION 01 OTlilt BODY
(1) Either Congress or the Cabinet (1 person).
(2) Either the Vice President, or the ('abinet, or Congress (2
persons).
(3) The Cabinet and the Vice P'esident (1 person).
(4) Either the Vice President or a special body (1 person).
(5) Either the Vice President or (ongrA, aidl a special body
(1 perl i).
U. PROPOSAL IIY WILLIAM W. CIOSsKI/Y
'rosske's proposal: 'itt the reiedy in cases under the Presi-
dential-iniilitv clause shall le by proce edings in thenature of quo
warrauto in the, national courts-dlid not follow the suggestions nade
in section 11 of the questionnaire, and 1i11lV properly he considered as
an alternatives to the tyie of proposal which was assumed in thalt, and
several of the other questions in the questionnaire.
A sumtairy of the repLies to the questionnaire and of continents
alildev iii te'stiinoiy it hearings on tin' subject is presented below,
under the following heiadigs:
Ak. rFhie Colin'ress.
IB. rfT(1 I Vice Il'(.sident-.
I). An" other g'rollp, iluing id'lwiidt ll ivI, ti
E. d1l1 (1)) be of a continuing or temporary Il1ltire?
IF. Comlbinations of tine Congress, the Vice President, the
Cabinet, lnd a special omissionn or other body.
G. Proposal by William w. Crosskey.
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
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A. THE CONGRESS
Aikin (11121): [Aikin did not specifically recommend a process of
initiation of determination of inability but, by implication, it
would be vested in Congress which he recommended as the body
to make the determination. See III, below.]
Bailey (P4): "(* * * should come from a concurrent resolution of time
United States Congress."
Frelinghuysen (1125-29, 34-35, 37): "* * * to argue that a Vice
President himself should act * * * asks too much of human
nature. [Much of this discussion concerned determination, rather
than the initiation of consideration, of disability. By implication,
it, appears that the witness did not favor initiation by the Cabinet
or by the Congress or by an unofficial committee. "In discussing
his own alternative joit resolution, H. J. Res. 442, (11 34-35)
the witness stated-] Section II states that 'if the President
announces lie is unable to discharge the powel's and duties of his
office, such powers and duties shall devolve upon the Vice Presi-
dlent.' * * * Section Ill provides that the Congress, by a con-
current resolution approved by two-thirds of each louse, may
'suggest' that the President is unable to discharge the powers anzi(Inties of his office. For the purpose of considering such a reso-
lution the Vice President may convene the Senate, and the
Speaker the House of Representatives."
Howe ('35): [Howe answered 1I and III together: see 11 below. lie
stated his belief] "* * * that the power to inquire and ulti-
mately to decide whether 'inability', temporary or permanent,
exists, is to l)e exercised l)y the Congress. * * * I should see
no reason why the Cabinet might not initiate congressional
action, but I take it that no statute or resolution need assert that
right."
Peltason (P51) : [Initiation of a determination of Presidential inability
could be] "1upo petition [to the Supreme Court] of either chamber
of Congress or during Congress' adjournment upo petition of
any 2 or 3 of time following: Vice President, Speaker, President pro
teml)ore of tie Senate, congressional majority and minority l)arty
leaders."
II (a)-(e)-6
I. TilE VICE PRESIDENT
Finletter (P 27-28): [Finletter replied to II and III together, and his
reply is summarized in III below ie stated that (le President
aught initiate action if lie were capable of making the decision
but, since it is likely that lie would not be able, (lie responsibility
should fall on (lie Vice President] "I should not think that airy
other person oi- hody should initiate tle question or nake tliedecisionl."
ltolcombe (P 34): " * * tie Vice President. Ile might be prompted
to raise this question by a request from the Cabinet or a resolui ion
of the Congress, but in my opillool that is not necessary since
it is the duty of the Vice President to act in case of tile President's
inability".
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Huber (P 35-36): [Huber discussed II and III together: see III
below. By implication, either the President to the Vice President
might initiate the question of Presidential inability to act.]
Hyman (H50-60): [In his testimony, Hyman (lid not specifically
discuss the proper agency to initiate a determination of Presi-
dential inability, but rather the agency to make the determina-
tion. lie expressed his approval of the draft measure prepared
by the counsel and the staff director of the Committee (H53-54)
providing that the President may declare his disability if he is in
a position to do so (see. 2); and that the Vice President, or the
person next in line of succession to the Presidency, if he is satisfied
that the President or the person discharging the powers and duties
of that office as the case may be, is unable to discharge those
powers and duties, shall convene both houses of Congress and
announce that the powers and duties have devolved upon him
(see. 3). Hyman specifically stated that he would not have the
Cabinet- (H50) nor Congress (1150-51) nor the Supreme Court
(H61) take any part in the process of initiating or determining
disability.]
Payne (1114, 16): "In this event [just plain physical inability] the
President, himself, should make the determination and notify
the Congress. * * * On the other hand inability could be of
such a nature that the President could not make the decision.
* * * In this event * * * to my mnd there is only one logical
person to do this. tie is the Vice President. * * * * * * it
would appear that the Vice President should only raise the ques-
tion an( that the determination should be made by some other
agency." (1114) [In this bill, S. 2763 (briefly described at P16)
PaIne provided] "that tile President notify, the Congross in
writing of his inability, if able to do so, * * * [ii the disability
prevented the President from acting, and if] * * * the Vice
PI'resident had good cause to believe that such an inability existed
lhe would notify the Chief Justice."
Peters (H122): "In the case of serious illness of the President, the
President himeself might properly raise the question of his own
liability. * * * In case of mental incapacity of the President
it would appear to be the duty of the Vice President to raise the
questionn of the President's inability. In the. case of capture or
imprisonment of the President it is also clear that it would be
the duty of the Vice President to raise the question of the Presi-
dent's inability."
Pritchett (P52-54): [Pritchett (lid not specifically discuss the process
of intiation as separate from the process of final determination
(see Ill, below). (1) In case the President was able to act,
Pritchett recommended that he initiate the process. (2) In case
he was unable, Pritchett recommended that the Cabinet initiate
Pritchett (1174-75): [Pritchett expressed his objections to initiation
by the Supremne Court or Congress] "Originally I had thought
when I submitted my first proposal that the Cabinet was a
superior body to have. this power because the Vice President was
so. directly ane personally involved. On further reflection, I
have conic to conclude that the Vice President probably is
already granted, by the Constitution, authority to make this
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determination and, consequently, I would propose simply
spelling out tie principle which would recognize the role of tha
Vice President and perhaps try to associate some restraints in
connection with exercise of that power [The wordin* of Pritch-
ett's proposal was as follows-] If tlie President is suffering
from a constitutional disability, and fails or is unable to notify
the Congress of his inability, the Vice President, after having
secured the advice of the President's Cabinet, shall make the
finding of inability and notify the Congress in writing of that
finding. * * *".
Romani (P57-59, 60): [The details of Romani's proposals for the in-
ititation of action and the actual decision are summarized in III
below. If the disabled President is able to do so lie should an-
nounce his inability to carry out his powers and duties. If lie is
unable to make such an announcement, the Vice President should
be authorized to do so.] [Rornani repeated the proposals sum-
inarized above, and added-] "* * * I would be willing, as a
second choice, to recommend the establishment of some pro-
cedure by which the facts of a President's inability be certified
to the Vice President. The natural body here would be the
notification by the Cabinet, or some other member of (lie Presi-
dent's staff, to the Vice President that the President is disabled.
The decision as to what should be done, however, would rest with
the Vice President."
C. THE CABINET
Hoover (P35, 111-2): [Question was not directly answered: by ilipli-
cation, the Cabinet.j
D. ANY OTHER GROUP, INCLUDING INDEPENDENT AGENCIES; AND
E. SHALL (D) BE OF A CONTINUING Ol 'TEMPORARY NATURE?
Fellman (P23): "* * * any member of the group or committee which
would be authorized 'by law to determine the question * * *
should be eligible to initiate the questionn. I do not believe that
Congress should undertake to perform this function [because. it
might not be in session and because its membership is too numser-
ous]. I should think it highly improper to entrust the Vice Presi-
dent with the initiative, since his personal stake in the decision
precludes general confidence in the objectivity of any affirmative
step he may take. Since the Cabinet is m~ade ul of personal
apl)ointees of the President who serve at his pleasure, I would
regard the Cabinet as wholly unsuitable to make a decision of
the sort under discussion."
Hart (l'31--32): "At first glance it might seem desirable to have one
body initiate and another determine. But in this matter the
question of when to raise the question should be handled witht he same judicial discretion as the question of how to decide it..
The commissioners [see III below for description of the Cominis-
sioners on Presidential Inability] should be authorized to investi-
gate upon their own motion with or without the formal or in-
ormal suggestion of others and to make findings." [In his sketch
from which a draft bill might be prepared, Hart included the.
above provision in section (2)].
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Hart (1197): [Hart (lid not specifically discuss this point, but his
revised draft of proposed legislation made no change in tile alloca-
tion of both powers (initiation and determination) to tile Com-
missioners on I'residential Inability.]
Kroek (-162-68): " * * some kind of modus operandi is possible.From this the Vice President and Supreme Court should be
fir ly omitted. * * * There shall be created a body of limited
function known as the Inability Council * * * which shall in-
clude members of the Cabinet (which the statute should define)
or, as an alternative, the heads of Federal departments, the
Speaker and majority and minority leaders of the House of Repre-
sentatives, and i lite'Presidemt pro tempore, tie majority leader
alid the milorityx leader of the Sniate. On tie writ ten request, 
of
any two members of the Inability Council, provided they 
are not,
meinbers of tie same political party%, filed with the Secretary 
of
State, he (the Secretary of State) shall coniveie the (oticil 
* * *
to consider the desirabilit y of instituting a formal determination
of tie inability of the President. * * * Upon an aflirmative 
vote
of a majority of the Council, the Surgeon General of the Public
Itealth Service * * * shall designate an advisory panel of five
leaders of the medical profession, from the heads of the medical
departments of voluntary hospitals in various sections of the
United States. It will be the function of this advisory panel to
examine the facts and report, by majority finding, o1 the inability
of the President * * , tile palel having authority to call 
upona
special consultants for dvice. Such rep ort shall he made puhli .
On a ainjority finding of inability by the advisory panel**
the 7, ouncil shall vote on adoption of the finding, a inajorlty con-
trolling thed(ecisioli. [iewtssblvetatthe (onstituitionl
provides for tile President's declaring his own inability 
and that
tile new provisions shoulhl cOver a situation whein the President
is miabl or unwilling to announce his inability."
Lien (11123): lApl ltlYIN iien cm'oinit'lleded iitiationl of (lie ques-tioll of iiiabity by the special missionn, described ill Ilt
below, which lie proposed as th, body for deteriniuilig 
the exist-
Cice of inability.]
Sutherland (P 1): "If tille question of inability Were to be raised 
lby
ti' house of Rejii'esclitat\ives, Witli opeln (isellSSioll (by analogy
to inpeachniniit) these elds night be attained, though in ('ase
of a IHouse bitterly opposed to a I'resident, Suspicion 
of politics
would imcvitablv at tach. Furthermore tlie louse might not le
ill session. ** One of the committees night have 
this
ditty dehlgatcd to it by Ipre'ious egisliatiol. 'liIe Cabinet * * *
Would i,' frie of tl sliggestion of hostile parlisallship, though
the" would tend to it slow action out of lovalt\v, unless 
tile dis-
ability were o!,Viuu.s aml tile need cr'iticai. '.rhals 
this is a
good thing. Some special hody * * * could he set 
uip to in
ald ays ill existis1e. I iI, i' to favoi leka 'ii g this matIri 
with
the ('abint."
Sutherhul (1178. 8I-8:3): ['rhc witless did not distinguish c,carly
betweli the iinitiation of a process of determination, 
a(d actliial
determination. lH staled that originally, whe l
he replied to
tle tulist ionfmuire, lie had thoug-ht of the (abinet only, but that
lie had bell wliilled away to Krock's point of view. h His 
pro-
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postal at tile hearing was as follows:-] " * * a special body
coull be created * * * to consist of tile Chief Justice, the two
Secretaries of State and Defense, and the leaders of the President's
party ini the Senate and House. * * * Naturally this Presiden-
tial Commission * * * would inform itself by medical or other
expert opinion concerning the inability in question.- Appro-
priate provision could be mode for its call by the Chief Justice, or
by any two members."
F. COMBINATIONS OF THE CONGRESS, THIE VICE PRESIDENT, TilE CABINET,
OR A SPECIAL COMMISSION OR OTHER BODY
(1) Either congresss or the Cabinet
Pennock (P52): "* * * both Congress and the Cabinet should be
empowered to initiate the question * * * by majority vote,
Either body should be able to do this without the concurrence of
the other."
(2) Either the Vice President, or the Cabinet, or Congress
Fairman (PH8-19): "* * * the 'inability' might be self-evident.
Suppose, for one example, that the President were captured and
held as a prisoner of the enemy. * * * In such case, surely
there would be no ieed to initiate tih question. * * 
* Again,
it is conceivable that the President himself 
might authentically
determine his own inability. * * * Consider the less unlikely
situations, where liabilityty' or no was a matter to be determined!
by inquiry. Here let us recur to the Constitution. * * * the
provsin is not permissive and optional: if in truth there is
inability, then the powers and duties shall decolce by the Constitu-
tion's own comma(l. So any initiating and any determining
will only be the means for carrying out the peremptory l)rovision.
Evidently the Vice President should be able to set. the inquiry
ill motion, for lie is under a soleln(Il duty to rise to the occasion
if inability occurs. * * * The Cabinet, too, should be able to
set the iliquiry in motion. * * * Surely a mere majority of the
membership should suffice. * * * Initiative should also lie
within the Congress. * * * It might, however, be impracticable
for the Congress to act: * * * The statute should, I believe,
provide that certain designated leaders of the House of Congress
would be authorized to initiate an inquiry into 'Iability'."
Sparkman (119-10): "I agree with those who recommend a flexible
method for beginning the inquiry. Initiation of the proce(lre
for makiig the determination of the President's disability should
not be limited to a single person or a single small group of people.
The obligation should be sufficiently widespread to assure its
immediate exercise once it is required. * * * I thiuk the proposal
of Harvard Law Professor Charles Fairman, that the \ice
President, the Cabinet, and the Congress all be allowed to start
the inquiry iin addition to the President himself, is a good sug-
gestion."
(3) The Cabind and the Vice Preyulent
Brown (15): " * * should be made by tile Cabinet and the V ice
President. In case of physical disability only, the President
himself might suggest that the Vice President act il his place."
-11,
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(/) Either the Vice JPresident or a special body
Corwin (PI6): "* * * undoubtedly within the power of the Vice
President to do this, * * * and clearly any body which might. he
authorized by Congress to determine whether 'inability' exists
in fact ought to have the right to raise the question."
(5) Either the Vice President or Congress, and a special body
Kallenbach (P45-46): JA permanent nct of Congress should] "make
,naiifest the sense of Congress that a President in the event of
his inability to exercise the powers and duties of his office, may
so declare on his own initiative, and thus cause the powers and
duties of his office to devolve upon his successor for the duration
of his inability. [This was followed by a description of the
formal steps to be taken in such an action.] * * * A more
difficult problem is presented in case the President is actually
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and is
at the same time unale and,or unwilling to [approve the Vice
President's assuming them. * * * As. the Constitution now
stands, both the right amd tile obligatioi to assumie the powers
an1d duties ol the I'residiency alre Vested ill the Vice P'resident.
IIe cannot escape them, 110V 0nl Congress, by statute, circi-iil-
crilv his authority to exercise his con1 stitiutional duty as he sees
it. * * * Neither the Congress no the Suprmne ourt is an
appropriate body, under our system of se)lpartedt powers, to
offieialy initiate inquir'v into the (luestilon of a Presideit's
inahilityv; although it would lcearly' be within the province of
Congress, at any time, to pass a (,coeurrellt resolution expressing
its nttitule in'a situation giving rise to this question. * * *
Kallenbach recommended the establishment of an Advisory
Council consistinig of those officers ili line of presidential successiOn
(see I below).] Similarly any I (or perhalis it should be any 2)
of theil members of this Advisorv Council should be authorized
to initiate an(I present to it tile question of whethe," the circ(um-
stances are such as to warrant and require that the officer nlext
in line of succession to the President act a" President."
Kallenbach (H85-87 and 90-91): [At the hearing Kallenbach proposed
the enactment of a statute and of an amendment. He approved
Sections (a) (b) and (c) of S. 2763 (Senator l'avne's i)il) as
described by Payne at 1114-16, but proposed alterations in
Sections (d) and (v) of that plan (1185-87). In case tile President
was able to do so, lie would make tile determination and notify
Congress (!i16). Kallenlbach's proposal stated] "(d) If tle Vice
President has sufficient cause to believe that the President is,
for a specified reason or reasons, unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office and that the 'resident is unable to so
notify the Congress pursuant to sublsection (a), the Vice President
shall'so nlotify [tile secretaries of the ten Executive Departments]
and tile President pro tempore of tile Senate and Speaker of tile
House [of Representatives], and request their opinion on whether
he should assume the powers and duties of the office of Presi-
dent. * * * (e) The Congress may, by concurrent resolution
al)proved by two-thirds of each flouse, suggest that there is
sufficient cause to believe that tile President is, for a specified
reason or reasoils, unable to discharge the powers and duties of
I
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his office, and request that [the secretaries of the ten Executive
Departments), the President pro tempore of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, render their opinion on
whether the Vice President should assume the powers and duties
of the President. [Tile constitutional amendment proposed by
Kallenbach at H90-91 was brief and provided the authority for
Congress to enact legislation as described above: see sections
(1) and (2).] * * * the specific grant of power to Congress to
legislate conclusively on how Presidential inability shall be
determined is new. It would resolve any doubts on this point
and permit the legislation enacted by Congress on this matter
to be regarded as mandatory. * * *
G. PROPOSAL BY WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY
Crosskev (1199, 103, 112-119): "Briefly, my view is, that a case
involving * * * alleged inability on the part of the President
todischarge the powers and dutiesof his office * * * is essentially
a controversy about the title to a public authority or office; anl
that tie remedy in such case is what was customary in essentially
similar cases when the Constitution was drawn. The remedy in
such cases was traditional a1(1 had long been an action of quo
warranto, * * * 1 think the matter is fullS covered in the
Constitution. * * * [The witness was asked to describe how such
a case would b brought before the Supreme Court, by quo
warranto. He stated that] * * * the customary way is for theAttorney General * * * to file the writ or modernly to file an
information in the nature of a quo warranto. It can be done by
these officials or it can be done by interested citizens if Congress
so provides. The Supreme Court has said that, in the absence of
legislation otherwise by Congress, quo warranto can be brought
about by the Government only. * * * I don't see why the.
[Supreme] Court should step out. They certainly have not the
personal and political interest in these cases that tile Cabinet
has anl it seems to Ine * * * that the best qualified group to
deal with this sort of question is the Supreme Court. * * *
[Crosskey also filed a reply to the questionnaire (11105-119),
Part IV' of which (11112-115) health with the use of the writ of
quo warranto, and Part V ([[115- 119) of which dealt with use of
qtto warrant and tile alternative plans of determining inalbillty,
with the witness' criticism of the latter. Crosskey dealt witi
sliitable Congressional legislation at 11117-118, as follows-]
* * * Congressional -legislation, in my judgment, is very (Isir-
able for two purposes. The first purpose * * * is a clarification
of the general understanding of the Constitution as it, relates to
this whole matter. Any legislation by Congress ought, therefore,
to inake clear that the remedy in cases under the Presidential-
inability clause shall be by proceedings in the nature of _quo
warronto, in the national courts; that such cases are 'cases, in law,
arising under the Constitution.' * * * 'he legislation ought also
toI indicate the opilnion of Congress-and of the President, if lie
signed the law (as presuniablyi he wouhd)-that tlne right of the
Vice President, in inability cases, is merely to 'act as President'
temporarily 'until [the President's] disability be removed'. This
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could be done by giving an absolute right to initiate proceedings,
as a relator, not only to the Vice President in cases of Presidential
inability, but to tile President in cases where his 'disability 
[is
later] rernove( * * * A second object which I think Congress
ought to have in any legislation it passes is that of molding 
the
reme of quo wa.-ranto * * * so as to assure that * 
* * the
inrened remedy will be used when the public interest demands 
it.
[After discussing difficulties inherent in the Supreme Court's
d6ff-rine that, in the absence of explicit legislation to the contrary
by Congress, the remedy in quo warranto, as against national
officers, is available only to the Government-practically 
speak-
ig only to tie Administration-Crosskey proposed] giving
absolute relators' rights to initiate proceedings * * * along 
with
a right to their own separate counsel, to the op position party 
in
Congress. [This was explained in sonic detail. Crosskey then
discussed tle possibility of putting inability-clause cases 
within
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Under the
Court's present doctrine, Congress cannot add to its original
jurisdiction but Crosskey thought that the Court might] be
willing to overrule it [this doctrine] if given the opportunity.
Otherwise * * * it will be necessary to amiend the Constitution.
It would be sufficient to say: 'Tie Constitution shall not hereafter
be construed to forbid Congress from adding to the originaljurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States as that is
provided in the Constitution'. Such an amendment, I suppose,
would be readily ratified. tin discussing the statement that 
the
Court could not hear inability-clause cases because they would 
be
political in character, Crosskey stated-] There would be no
room for the application of this doctrine in presidential-inability
cases. [Note:-Crosskey's proposal as summarized above was
quite unlike the proposals of the other experts. 
The questions
I -VII in the questionnaire were generally inapplicable to 
his
proposal. lie stated: "I seem to be in a minority of one 
in
thinking that some provision was made in reference to 
this
matter in the Constitution bf the United States, especially with
respect to the determining of Presidential inability." (199)]
III.
III. Once raised, who shall make the determination of inability?
(a) The Congress.
(b) The Vice President.
(c) The Cabinet by majority vote.
(d) Any other group, including independent agencies.
(e) Shall (d) be of a continuing or temporary nature?
As was the case with the replies to question II-"Who shall 
initiate
the question of the President's inability?".the replies to 
question
Ill presented a wide variety of proposals; they did not in general
follow the form of reply as suggested in the subsections of 
the ques-
tion; and there was considera-be overlap in the replies to 
questions
II and III.
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As THE CONGRESS
Three persons in their replies proposed that Cong:ess make the
determination of inability; one proposed that the decision "be left to
the Vice President, the members of the Cabinet, and the presiding
officers of the House and Senate, after consultation with proper
medical experts" (Brown, in G below); and a fifth suggested "the
Congress, with the concurrence of the Vice President; or the Cabinet
acting by a majority vote" (Pennock in G below).
B. THE VICE PRESIDENT
Six persons proposed that the Vice President determine Presiden-
tial inability (in one case-Pritchett-a different proposal was made
in his reply° to the questionnaire but he later proposed the Vice
President, ;vith the advice of the Cabinet, in testimony at the hear-
ing). In his reply to the questionnaire Kallenbach (E (2) below)
proposed that the Vice President make the determination with the
advice of a special council; but he later changed this plan as a witness
at the hearing. Brown (G below) proposed determination by the
Vice President, the members of the Cabinet, and the presiding ofcers
of the House and Senate, after consultation with proper medical
authorities. Pennock (G below) suggested Congress, with the con-
currence of the Vice President, or the Cabinet acting by majority
vote.
C. THE CABINET
Former President Hoover proposed determination of inability by
the Cabinet. Pritchett (B above) in his reply to the questionnaire
proposed determination by the Cabinet, but later as a witness at the
hearings he offered a different proposal. Corwin (G below) suggested
"soinebody designated by Congress * * *; e. g., the Cabinet or the
National Security Council, enlarged perhaps by the Chief Justice
et al." Pennock (G below) proposed determnination by Congress
with the concurrence of the Vice President, or the Cabinet acting by
majority vote.
D. Til' SUPREME COURT
Two persons advocated determination by the Supreme Court.. A
third (Fairman, E (2) below) suggested tiat an amendmnent might
vest this power in the Court, or as an alternative Congress might
provide for a special commission with Supreme Court members, in-
ferior court members, and possibly some members of Congress. Cor-
win (G below) suggested "somebWdy designated by Congress * *
e. g., the Cabinet or the National Security Council, enlarged perhaps
by the Chief Justice et al."
E. ANY OTHER GROUP, INCLUDING INDEPENDENT AGENCIES; AND
F. SHALL (E) BE OF A CONTINUING OR TEMPORARY NATURE?
(1) Appoirtire groups made up of prim~te citizes.-Two persons
propose d appointment of a permanent commission by the Supreme
Court, and one proposed a panel of medical specialists appointed by
the Chief Justice.
SW959-57--4
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(2) Groups made up of government oqficiqls.---One person (Fairman)
proposed an ex officio commission consisting of the Supreme Court
justices, some inferior court justices, and a few members of Congress.
A second (Fellman) proposed an ex officio commission consisting of the
President's wife, the Chief Justice and senior Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the leaders of the President's party in the Senate
and the House. A third person (Kallenbach) made a proposal in is
reply to the questionnaire which he changed in his testimony as a
wi tness at the hearing. The latter proposal was for an ex officio body
consisting of the officers named in the line of Presidential succession
(the heads of the ten Cabinet departments and the President pro
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House). A fourth per-
son (Krock) proposed a council of ex officio members consisting of the
ten Cabinet heads, the majority and minority leaders of the House,
and the President pro tempore, the majority 'and minority leaders of
the Senate. A fifth person (Sutherland) niade a proposal in his reply
to the questionnaire which he chan ged in his testimony as a witness
at the hearing. The latter proposal was for a special x officio body
consisting of the Chief Justice, the two Secretaries of State and De-
fense, and the leaders of the President's party in the Senate and
House.
(3) No specific membership proposed.-Senator Sparkman proposed
final determination by "a group of persons.
G. COMBINATIONS OF THE CONGRESS, THE VICE PRESIDENT, 
THE
SUPREME COURT AND TilE CABINET
One person (Brown) proposed that determination of Presidential
inability be vested in the Vice President, the members of the Cabinet,
and the presiding officers of the House and Senate, after consultation
with proper medical experts (latter not required in case of the Presi-
(lent s enforced absence from the coui'try). A second reply (from
Corwin) provided for "somebody designated by Congress . . . e. g.
the Cabinet or the National Security Council, enlarged perhaps by
the Chief Justice et al." A third person (Pennock) suggested Con-
gress, with the concurrence of the Vice President, or the Cabinet
acting by a majority vote.
H. PROPOSAb BY WILLIAM W. CROSSKiEY
Crosskey's proposal: That the remedy in cases under the Presi-
dential-inability clause shall be by proceedings in the nature of quo
warranto in the national courts-did not follow the suggestions made
in section III of the questionnaire, and may properly be considered
as an alternative to the type of proposal which was contained in that,
and several of the other questions in the questionnaire.
A summary of the replies to the questionnaire and of comments
made in testimony at hearings on the subject is presented below,
under the following headings:
A. The Congress.
B. The Vice President.
C. The Cabinet.
D. The Supreme Court.
E.. Any other group, including independent agencies; and
F. Shall (E) be of a continuing or temporary nature?
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY22
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
G. Combinations of. trh Congress, the Vice President, the
Supreme Court and the Cabinet,
11. Proposal by.William W. Crosskey.
1I. Once raised, who shall 'make the determination of inability?
(a) The Congress,
(b) The Vice President.(c) The Cabinet by majority ote.(d) Any other group, including independent agencies.(e) Shall (d) be of a continuing or temporary nature?
(A) THE CONGRESS
Aikin (11121): " * * I would suggest * * * the adoption of a joint
resolution which would authorize the Congress to act at any
time bv concurrent resolution (1) to declare the existence of
a Presidential inability * * * and (2) to declare the prospective
duration of the disability * * *. It is suggested here that,
the rules of the two Houses of the Congress be amended toprovide that such a concurrent resolution could be introduced
in the appropriate House by either' the Speaker or the President
pro tempore, and by none other. If further caution seemed
necessary, the rules of the two Houses might be modified to
require that action on a motion to recognize the existence of a
Presidential inability would require an affirmative vote of a
majority of the entire membership of each House, and that the
vote of each member should be recorded in open meeting."
Holcombe (P34): "While the Vice President should raise the question,
he certainly should not make the final determination of inability.
In my opinion it, is the Congress which should make the final de-
termination. It can do so quite informally simply by consenting
to recognize the Vice Presidlent as the proper person with whom
it should deal in matters involving the exercise of the Executive
power under the Constitution. I see no reason why either the
Cabinet or any other group, including independent agencies,
should be consulted except in an informal manner by way of
courtesy."
Howe (P35'36): "* * * it is desirable that Congress by joint resolu-
tion or by statute, but in any case with the President's con-
currence, should assert one basic principle. * * * that, the power
to inquire and ultimately to decide whether 'inability', temporary
or permanent, exists is to be exercised by the Congress. In nyju(gnient the Vlice President is clearly disq qualified for interestfrom initiating * * * this issue. * * * I believe that the in-
limate association between the President and his Cabinet makes
it an inappro Hate body to decide the matter. I should see no
reason why trie Cabinet might not initiate congressional action,
but I take it that no statute or resolution need assert that right.
* * ~I believe that the Congress possesses today the sole power
• * * to assert an exclusive authority over the matter of aPresident's 'inability'. I believe that such n assertion of
authority, concurred'in by the President., would serve usefully to
clarify an important. issue and would (to so without imposing
unfortunate limitations on an authority which should be largely
unlimited."
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(n1) THE VICE PRESIDENT
Finletter (P27-28): "Nor do I think the situation call be met by
setting up some expert person or body to make the decision as
to ability . I lave slggested that the ability of the
President should be established by public opinion and that in-
ability shou l not lie held to exist'except when the facts were so
obvious that there would be a general recognition by the people
that, the President was incapable of performing his duties. [Cer-
t ain acts must be performed by the President and, if he is disabled,
these cannot be performed.) * * * for a while such a situation
might be tolerated but if it continued too long public opinion
would develop rapidly * * * and woul demand that 'something
be done'. At this point it woul seem to be the responsibility of
the Vice lIresident to move or not to move, depending upon the
circumstances. Of course, if the President himself were capable
of taking the decision thal he was not capable of carrying out his
duties it would le appropriate for hini to so state and to delegate
temporarily his responsibilities to the Vice President. But uider
most circumstances of inability it is likely that the President
would not be capable of this action; and thie responsibility sold
then fall up1on the Vice 'resident. * * * I should not think that
any other pOIS01 or body should initiate the question or make
tie decision. The Congress * * * wouhi be barred therefrom
by the priln'iple of separation of powers. * * * Nor do I believe
tiat the Cabinet h1s anv constitutional sthis to act.
The sanle comment applies to ally * * * independent agency
* * here is one other possibiliiv that is a dcterniina-
lion of the question by' the Supreme Court * * *. 'Fis * * *
might arise in the ordhlary course of litigation * * *. There is
tile further question whether original jurisdiction might lie giveln
to the Suprenle Court. to decide by way of declaratory judgment
whether iuiaLilitv existed. The question seemingly las been pit.
to rest by Marbury v. Madison * ** Nor, aside front obvious
practical' objections, may the ififerior Federal courts decide upon
the succession by way of a declaratory judgilclllt" (because of
cOistititioitl limitaions on I heir jurisdiction].
Iluber (P36-37): "* * * who judges it present under the Coistitit-
tion * * * is clear etliough in theory, sice the President * * *
essentially is the onliy one with tile powcr. * * * experience has
shown that, ai ailing President is often not capable otf making the
decision. * * * The result is obviously unsatisfactorv. * * * it
seeins to ine, that. the decision * * * should not be m'ijade either
by the judicial or legislative branch of government. * * * A
third possibility would involve the creation of a separate lody-
probiablV appointed by Congres. * * * Any such body, how-
ever, tends to complicate government and would seem foreign to
our present government system. * * * The remaining possi-
bility * * * is that this decision lie made within the ex'cnlliv.
bran ch of Government itself. * * * Butit * * * this should not
mean that certain persons close to the President should make
decisions ili place of the President." IThis is followed by a
discussion of the constitutional delegation of power and possible
additiomial duties for the Vice President. The solution proposed
does not include direct recommendations as to the source of
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determination of inability.] "* * * it seems best that the
President and Vice President form an administrative team, with
the President iii the leadership position but the Vice President
able to make any or all decisions in the case of Presidential
incapacity and responsible to the electorate both for the decision
as to incapacity and for decisions he makes while acting on the
policy level."
Illyman (1150-52, 53-54, 56-60): "First * * * I would deny to a
body like the Cabinet, much less a part of such body, a Aight of
initiation or any role whatever in a disability proceedings. * * *
I would not have the Congress initiate or share directly in a
disability proceedings. * * Finally * * * I would most em-phatically deny to the Supreme Court or to any portion of its
membership alny part w itever in a disability proceedings.
[The witness expressed his approval of the draft measure preparedby the counsel and the staff director of the Committee (153-54)
providing that the President may declare his disability if le is in a
position to do so (see. 2); and that the Vice President or tie
person next in line of succession to the Presidency, if lie is satisfied
that, the President or the person then discharging the powers and
duties of that office, as the case may be, is unable to discharge
those powers and duties, shall convene both houses of Congress
and announce tiiat the powers and duties have devolved upon
him (see. 3).1 To the-extent that the draft -csolution * * * pro-
vides at least a moral if not a legal underpinning on which the
Vice President in time of emergency can decide the fact of a
Presidential disability, and then go on and serve in his place, I
believe that, draft, resolution should be viewed as the working
text. for the measure" [to be enacted by Congress]. (p. 60)
Peters (H122): "In the case of serious illness of the President, the
President himself should make the determination of inability.
* * * In cases of insanity of the President, long periods of come,
capture, or other condition known to the entire people of the
United Stales as constituting 'inability' it seems clear that the
Vice President should determine that there is inability of tie
President. In the normal course of events his judgment would
be confirmed by public opinion as expressed by the Congress."
Pritehett (P52-54). "Serious objections can be entered against any
plan which has been proposed to accomplish these purposes.
While Col gress might initiate the question, it is certainly too
large a body and without. training for making such a decision;
moreover, action of any kind which it might take would be sub-ject to attack as influenced by partisan politics. The Supreme
Court could not be given such a responsibility without a con-
stitutional amendment, and in any case time Judiciary should not
be involved in such a decisions. The N7ie resident has such a
direct personal interest in the matter that any decision he would
make would be highly suspect. The Cabinet would have the
advantage of close acquaintance and contact with the President
on which to base a judgment,, but their personal loyalty to him
and their stake in continuance in office wouhil probably prejudice
them against a finding of disability if it could be at, allav1oided.
Certainly no independent, ad hoc, or expert board * * * should
be given final authority to make a decision which could remove a
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President from office. Clearly the person best fitted to declare
the President's inability is tle President himself. * * * the
case for transferring this decision out of tile President's hands has
not, in iy opinion, been established. [In a draft of a bill (P. 54)
Pritchett,'lrovided the following:] Section 1. (a) If the Preside:t
of the United States shall determine that lie is unable to discharge
the powers anl duties of his office he shall notify the Congress
of that fact in writing. * * * (b) If the Presidenit is, by reason
of his inability, unable to notify the Congress of his inability, the
President's Cabinet shall make the finding of inability and notify
the Congress in writing of that finding. * * *"
Pritchett (1[70-72, 74-76): [In a draft of a bill (1171) the witness
offered a version differing from that which lie had earlier included
in his reply to the questionnaire, as quoted above] "See. 1. If
the president of the United States shall determine that. ite is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, lie shall
notify the Congress of that fact in writing. * * *See. 2. If the
President is suffering from a constitutional inability mid fails or
is unable to notify the Congress of his inability, the Vice I'residlent,
after having sec'ued the advice of the Presidelent's Cabinet, shall
make the finding of inability and notify the Congress in writing
of that finding. * * * In ray earlier iraft, I provided that if
Congress was not in session ile notification went to the Speaker
of the House and the President pro teipore of the Senate or
either of them, and that would probably safeguard it.'
Romiani (P57-59, 60): "The central issue is'whetir the same agency
or individual should initiate and determine tile question of a
President's disability, or whether this right should be shared. * * *
Thie following discussion cover-ed the two situations in wicl
the necessity for action might arise.l In the first Contingency
[in which the disabled President is capable of taking limited
action] the President should aunouiiee that he is, (I will I)e,
unable to act. * * * The situation in which a President is com-
pletely disabled without warning * * * is, perhaps, the crucial
issue. * * * In keeping with constitutional principle, it seems
that tile decision, )il as to the initiation and determination of
the inability, should be vested in some area of the executive
hramich, aid the most logical place is in the Vice 'r-esidency, * * *
It is been proposed )y others * * * that Congress imtite the
action, aiid the Siiprenie Court or some other independent agcy,
make Ihe deternnination of Presidential inability. This approach
seems unliwise for several seasons. (Romnaii pielparel a draft joint
resolitioll proposiig a constitutional andl(llent. It included
thle following provisions- Sec. 2. If the Presidclit ailioiil('ces
thait le is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,Such -e,' and1 duties shimi (levolve upon, the Vice P resident.
Se,. 3. If the President is unable to make such an anun em ent,
tle Vice President shall anoiunice that tile President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of the l'esi(lenit. allid said
!powver's 111(1 duties shall thereul)Oll devolve upon tile Vice Presi-del .'
Romani (1'[41--43): [At the leaings Romanii i-epeatcd his recoi-
mendation, stated above, concenling initiation by the 'residelnt.
il the second contingency (in which the 'resident because of
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disability is unable to act) lie favored the following-] "if the
Vice President or person next in line is satisfied that the President
is unable to act, lie shall then assume, the powers, * * *" [Ile
again rejected proposals suggesting that thle Supreme Court, a
special inability Commission, or Congress either initiate or dIe-
termine thle qiiestioni of inability.]
(e) THE CABINET
Ioover (P35 and 111-2): "E* * * the determination of disability * * *
should rest with the Cabinet. * * *." (W35) [This was repeated
with further explanation and this additional comment- "If the
determination of inability * * * were in the hands of the
Congress, it could, in case of a congressional majority of the
pposingparty, result in nullification of the will of the people."
(D) THE SUPREME COURT
Bailey (P4): " I * * l should recommend that the Chief Justice
of the United States Supreme Court be empowered by the
concurrent resolution initiating the issue of Presidential inability
to appoint all ad hoc body of 7 private citizens, not more than '3
from any one party and including at least 2 inen of outstanding
reputation in medicine'and psychiatry. At. least 5 members
of said body after deliberation ani(l investigation should agree on
the President's inability, an( even their certification of inability
should be finally decided upon by the Supreme Court of the
United States."
Frelinghuysen (1129-30, 31-32, 35-36, 37): " 1 * * I do not believe
that Congress is the appropriate body to make the final deci-
sion * * *. Joint participation in tl;e disability procedure by
Congress and the Supreme Court will make it more likely that
tie final decision will be readily accepted bY the Nation * * *.
I believe that responsibility for'determining Presidential inability
should be placed elsewhere than the Cabinet * * *. [Although
Frelingh uysen approved the use of medical advice as to disability,
he did not, favor leaving the final determination to a body of
medical experts. If the Congress makes such a suggestion
of Presidential disability [as provided in Sec. Ill of Frelingliy-
sen's bill, li, J. lies. 442; see 11 above] Sec. 1II [of 11. J. lies. 442]
continues, the Supreme Court 'shall determine whelle or not
tie President is able to discharge such powers and duties.'
If the so find, these powers and duties shall devolve upon the
Vice President."
Peltason (I15l): [Upon Congressional petition as descril)ed in II,
above "The Supreme Court could be authorized to investigate,
appointing whatever assistance the justices consider necessary,
,111d to make a determination. * * *
(B) ANY OTHER GROUP, INCLUDING INDEPENDENT AGENCIES; AND
CF) SHALL (E) iE OF A CONTINUIYO Oil TEMPORAllY NATURE?
(1) Appointhre groups made up qf prhvte citiz-ens
HIart (1'30-33): jThe reply oe)vied vith a justification] for the pro-
sion of an orderly praeeire prescribed in advance by an act of
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Congress.] "The important function of a permanent statute is
to vest in some particular body responsibility for investigation and
factfinding. To whom should this responsibility be given? [Not
to Congress, the Vice President, the Cabinet nor the courts, for
reasons stated.] No existing agency appearing to be suitable, it
would be for Congress to create one bylaw. It might be called
the Commissioners on Presidential Inability. [In his sketch from
which a draft bill might be prepared, Hart included the follow-
ing-] (1) * * * three commissioners, to be known as the Coin-
missioners on Presidential Inability, shall be appointed by the
Supreme Court of the United States from among those private
citizens of the United States whose character and judgment shall
have won for them the respect of the Nation. The term of the
commissioners shall be for life, unless they be sooner removed by
the Supreme Court for inability or other cause. (2) The Com-
missioners are hereby charged'with the responsibility and com-
petence of investigating, upon their own motion with or without
the formal or informal suggestions of others, whether there exists
a case of (a) inability under the Constitution of the President of
the United States to'discharge the powers and duties of his office,
or of (b) permanent disability under the Constitution of the
President of the United States, and, if they conclude after such
investigation that such inability or permanent disability exists,
of so finding. (3) Upon a finding by the commissioners of in-
ability, the Vice President shall forthwith exercise the office of
Presiilent. * * * (4) After a finding * * * of inability [the com-
missioners are empowered to determine] whether thie said in-
ability has been removed, and [if they so conclude] the Vice
President shall forthwith cease to be pro tempore President * * *
and the President shall resume his office. * * * (5) A finding
b, the commissioners of inability may not be questioned in any
other place but may be superseded by [a finding that inability has
been removed or by a finding of permanent disability ]but not otbpr-
wise. (6) A finding of permanent disability ma,: be-made by
the commissioners in the first instance or by way'of superseding
a prior finding by them of inability. * * * (7) Upon [such a
finding) the Vice President * * * shall become President * * *
and shall remain President for the remainder of the unexpired
term. * * (8) A finding by the commissioners of permanent
disability may not be questioned in an), other place, nor shall it.
be reversed or modified by the commissioners, but shall stand
until the end of the unexpired term." [The more detailed pro-
visions of Hart's proposal have been ommitted in the above
summary.]
Hart (1192-98): [In his testimony the witness made certain changes
in the membership of the "Commissioners as provided in his
reply to the questionnaire (P32). lie proposed the following
draft of a joint resolution (1197)-] "That three (five) Comnis-
sioners to be known as the Commissioners on Presidential In-
ability shall be appointed by the Supreme Court of the United
States from among those private citizens of the United States
who arc active in some full-time capacity and whose character
and judgment shall have won for them the. respect of the Nation,
The term of each Commissioner shall last until his retirement
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from full-time activity or his acceptance of public office unless
he be sooner removedby the Supreme Court for cause. See. 2.
If the Commissioners on Presidential Inability or any two (three)
or more of them, giving all reasonable weight to the opinion of
the President, declare in writing that they are satisfied by evidence
which shall include the evidence of physicians that the President
of the United States is by reason of 'infirmity of mind or body
unable. for the time being to discharge the powers and duties of
his office or that, they are satisfied by evidence that the President
is unable to discharge those powers and duties because he is for
some definite cause not available for their discharge, then * * *
those powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice Presi-
dlent * * *."
Lien (H123): [Lien expressed his disapproval of determination of
inability by Congress or the Cabinet.] "A better plan would
seem to b5 the creation of a Special Board or Commission of
.5 or 7 members appointed by the Supreme Court. for long and
possibly staggered terms-but not for life or even good behavior.
The board or commission would need 'authority to employ spe-
cialists and experts. The members should be removable by the
Court. As a safeguard against any arbitrary or corrupt action
by the Cabinet or Board or Commission, authority might be
given to Congress or to the Supreme Court to take action on the
petition of the President (1) to declare mill and void an order
declaring a state of inability * * *."
Payne (1114-16): [Payn(e stated his reasons for believing that neither
the Vice President, Congress, a select committee of Congress nor
the Cabinet is a suitable agency for determining whether Presi-
dential inability exists (P14-15). Ile expressed disapproval of
the proposal that the Supreme Court should make the decision on
a petition for a writ of mandamus to order the Vice President to
exercise the functions of the President (P15). In his own bill(S. 2763) Payne provided] "that the President notify the Congress
in writing of his inability, if able to do so, and such notification
would automatically give the Vice President the res)onsiI)ility of
exercising the powers and duties of the President, but would not
give him the title. * * * With regard to disability of a nature
that prevented the President from notifying Congress, the bill
provides that if the Vice President had good cause to believe that
such an inability existed lie would notify the Chief Justice. The
Chief Justice %&ould then appoint a panel of qualified, civilian,
medical specialists who would examine the President. Each
member would individuallv submit a report of his findings, stating
the physical condition of the President, and his conclusion of
whefler the President was able to exercise the powers and duties
of his office. If all the members of the panel agreed in the con-
clusion that the President was suffering an inability, the Chief
Justice would notify the Congress in writing. Such" notification
would have the effect of placing the powers and duties, but not
the tile of President, on the Vice President."
(2) Groups made up qf goernment qfficiais
Fairman (P19-20): [Fairman stated his reasons for objecting to the
vesting of this function in Congress.] "If it seemed good to
Sr'059-57-5
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Cong ress to propose an amendment to make provisions for the
incidents of an atomic war, then one provision might well make the
Supreme Court the judge of Presidential 'Inability.' If an
amendment is not to be sought, then a satisfactory alternative is
next to 1)e considered. Congress might provide'that the ques-
tion of 'Inability,' when properly raised, would be determined by
an extraordinary Commission * * * including the Chief Jus-
tice---(who might well be designated as the one to call the Com-
missioners together)-and the Associate Justices. It might be
provided that, for want of the requisite number, active judges of
the inferior courts be summnnone(l, in order of seniority, as was
found practicable. If Congress thought it desirable to include
some of its own members in the extraordinary Commission, that
might be done. For example, the two available senior members,
mnfajority and minority, of each Committee on the Judiciary.(It seems evident that the Speaker and the President pro tempore
of the Senate should be excluded from serving as judges of Presi-
dential inability, inasmuch as they themselves stand high in the
order of succession.)"
Fellnan (P23-24): "1 suggest the creation by statute of a special
continuing committee which would be empowered to make the
critical decision of inability. * * * I would tentatively suggest.,
as a basis for further discussion * * a committee of five. The
members of the committee could very vell be the following:
(a) Tl President's spouse, o: if there is none, the next of
kinl, providing he or she is an adult.(b) The Chief Justice of the United States.(c) The senior Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States.(d) The leader of the President's party in the Senate.
(e) The leader of the President's political party in the
House of Representatives. * * *
"I would insist that members of the political party in opposition
to the President should not be put in the position of participating
in the decision . * * * [A findia" of disability] should be made
in writing, on the basis of evidence, including the evidence of
physicians."
Kallenfach (1'45-46): [Kallenbacmh proposed a dechluatory statute
providing] "that a President in the event of his inability to
exercise tme lowers and duties of his office, imi11 so declare oin
his own initiative, and tiums cause the powers and duties Of his
office to devolve tipon his constitutional successor for the duration"
of his imabilitv. * * * the statute might well direct that the
President's inlmtit to recognize slch a devolvement of powerl's
shall be formulated in writing and ski ed by himi; that it be
directed to tile office t upon whom the dluty of acting il Ilis place
falls, normally time Vice 'resident; and thaot copics of it, be sent
also to the heads of the other coorldiliate brinlches of tile GOv.-
eruiictit, [Congress and the Supreme Court] * * * as all afhicial
notification * * * that the (levolutiol of powers lias occurred
and has his sanction. * * * A more (iltult problem is 1llr-
sented ill case the President is actually umiale to discharge the)owes alid duties of his office, and is [it the same time unable
and/or unwlmillillg to express acqiuiesceclie ill the Vice President's
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assuming [them]. As tile Constitution now stands, both the
right and the obligation to assume [these powers and duties]
are vested in the Vice President. Ile cannot escape them, nor
can Congress, by statute circumscribe his authority to exercise
his constitutional duty as lie sees it. In my opinion, however,
this does not foreclose Congress from * * *" setting up a pro-
cedure by which the Vice President may seek, or be given, advice
and political support in making a determination of what his
course of action should be in [such a situation.] [The advisory
body proposed by Kallenbach included as members] the other
officers in the line of succession. * * * For that purpose [the
Vice President] should be authorized to assemble these officers
as a special Advisory Council. * * * [This Council should be
authorized to examine all relevant facts and to consult expert
medical opinion] and by majority action, to make findings. * * *
If it finds that the President is ablee to exercise the powers and
duties of his office in the constitutional sense, it, may by majority
action, advise and recommend that the officer upon whom the
duty of acting as President would devolve under the Constitution
or laws, should assume forthwith the powers, of the Chief Execu-
tive. * * * The statute should pro flde further that the site-
ceeding officer should notify in writing the heads of th, other
branches of his intent to assume the constitutional powers and
duties of the Presidency during continuance of the P6sident's
inability. lis notification should set forth the findings 5nd
recommendations of the factlinding gron as evidence of the
basis of his action, if lie is acting upn the nsis of such a reconi-
melidlation."
Kallenbach (1185-87 and 90-91): [At the hearings Kallenbach pro-
posed the enactment of a statute and of an amendment. Ile
approved Sections (a) (b) and (c) of S. 2763 (Senator Payne's
bill) as described by Payne at 1114-16, but proposed alterations
in Sections (d) and (e) of that plan (1185-87). In case the
President was able to do so, lie would make the determination and
notify Congress (1116). In II, above, Kallenbach's proposal in
Section (d) for the initiation of action by the Vice President is
quoted. After the procedure thus established, Section (d) con-
tinued as follows-] "If two-thirds of the officers so notified find
and determine that the President is unable to discharge such
*powers and duties, thev shall devolve upon the Vice President.
* * * [In II, above, Rallenbach's proposal in Section (e) for
initiation of action by concurrent resoution of Congress is quoted.
After the procedure thus established, Section (e) continued as
follows-1] "If two-thirds of the officers to whom the request is
directed find and determine that the President is unable to dis-
charge such powers and duties, they shall devolve upon the Vice
President as provided in subsection (d). [The constitutional
amendment proposed by Kallenbach at 1190-91 was brief and
provided the authority 'for Congress to enact legislation as de-
scribed above: See sections (1) and (2).] * * * the specific grant
of p wer to Congress to legislate conclusively oil how Prosidea-
tia inability shall be determined is new. It would resolve any
doubts on this point and permit the legislation enacted by Con-
gress on tis matter to be regarded as mandatory * * *"
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Krock (62-8): Krock advocated the establishment, of an InabilityCouncil consisting of the Cabinet and Congressional leaders (as
described in II above), and he set forth the procedures for calling
it into action and for the naming of an advisory, panel of physi-
cians.) "It will be the function of this medical] advisory com-
mittee to examine the facts and report, by majority finding, on
the inability of the President * * 'P, the panel having authority
to call upon special consultants for advice. Such report shall be
made public. On a majority finding of inability by the advisory
panel * the Council shall vote.on adoption of the finding,
a majority controlling the decision. [T.he witness believed that
the Constitution provides for the President's declaring Iis own
inability and that the new provisions should) cover a situation
when the President is unable or unwilling to announce his
inability."
Sutherland (P61): "Of course the Supreme Court has detachment,
and profound respect is given to it by the people of the country;
but by the Constitution it is limited to judicial functions, which
wouldsem to exclude matters such as [determination of Presi-
dential inability]. A standing 'Commission on Presidential
Disability' could be set up by statute to be ready at all times.
Either I ouse could make the decision, if authorized by statute,
but the Congress might not be in session. On the whole I come
back to the idea that the Cabinet would be an appropriate body
to perform this task."
Sutherland (H78-83): "Perhaps a compromise would be desirable; a
special body could be created by the amendment, to consist of
the Chief Justice, the two Secretaries of State and Defense, and
the leaders of the President's purty in the Senate and House.
Such a body would represent all three branches of the Government
and would thus, if. unanimous, gain wide popular support."
(H78) [Discussion of this plan at H81-83.1
(3) No specific membership proposed
Sparkman (H10-11): "The final determination should be made by a
group of persons. * * * While a unanimous decision would
be preferred, I think an extraordinary majority' ruling should
be allowed." (He spoke with approval of recent proposals for
such an agency, but did not make any specific recommendation.]
(0.) COMBINATIONS OF THE CONGRESS, THE VICE PRESIDENT, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND THE CABINET
Brown (P5): "Determination of Presidential physical and inental
inability might well be left to the Vice President, the members
of the*Cabinet, and the presiding officers of the House and
Senate, after consultation with proper medical experts. The
latter need not be required in case of enforced absence of the
President from the country."
Corwin (P16): "Somebody designated by Congress whose determina-
tion of the matter may 'be fairly expected to be'accepted as
conclusive; e. g, the Cabinet or the National Security Council,
enlarged perhaps by the Chief Justice et al."
Pennock (I52)': " * * I would suggest that the power to make the
determination of inability should be vested in two bodies: the
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Congress, with tile concUireicO of the Vice President; or the
Cabinet acting by a majority vote."
(H.) PROrOSAL AY WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY
Crosskey (1199-119)- [The witness in his testimony (1199-105) and
in his reply to the questionnaire (11105-119) stated and supported
a proposal fot dealing with cases of Presidential inability which
was quite unlike the proposals of the other experts. The ques-
tions II-VII in the questionnaire were generally inapplicable to
Crosskey's proposal: see II above for a summarization of this
proposal.] "I seem to be in a minority of one -in thinking that
some provision was made in reference to this matter in the Con-
stitution of the United States, especially with respect to the
determining of Presidential inability." (M99)
IV. Are there any constitutional prohibitions relative to questions II
and III?
In 12 cases the replies to the questionnaire and the testimony of
witnesses at the hearing did not contain a specific answer to question
IV (see A below). Since questions IV and XI were overlapping- in
part, the general position of each of these 12 persons can be found
under question XI below. Three persons indicated, more or less
clearly, that they believed constitutional amendment to be necessary
relative to questions iI and III (see B below), and 10 indicated that
they did not believe amendment necessary (see 0 below). Obviously
each of these opinions was based upon the individual proposals which
had been made in questions 11 and III. One witness (Crosskey) made
proposals to which questions I-VI I were generally inapplicable.
A summary of the replies to the questionnaire and of comments
made in testimony at the hearing on the subject is presented below,
under the following headings:
A. Persons who did not specifically answer question IV.
B. Persons who indicated that constitutional amendment was
necessary, relative to q uestions II and III.
C. Persons Who indicated that constitutional amendment was
not necessary, relative to questions II and III.
D. Reply by William I. Crosskey.
A. PERSONS WHO DID NOT SPECIFICALLY ANSWER QUES '1ON IV
Aikin (11121): [In his reply Aikin did not specifically answer this
question: see "Aikin" in XI below for his general position].
Frelinghuysen (H33-35, 38-39): [In his testimony at the hearing
Frelinghuysen did not specifically answer this question: see "Fre-
linghuysen" in XI below for his general position].
Hoover (P35): [In his reply Hoover did not specifically answer tis
question: see "Hoover" in XI below for his general position].
Hoover (H1-2): [Question was not answered].
Howe (P35-36): [In.his reply Howe did not specifically answer this
question: see "Howe" in XI below for his general position].
Huber (P36-37): (In his reply Huber did not specifically answer this
question: see "Huber" in XI below for his general position].
Hyman (1152-54): [In his testimony at the hearing Hyman did not
specifically answer this question: see "Hyman" in XI below for
his general position].
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Krock (1162 and 64): [I1 his testimony at the hearing Krock did not
specifically discuss this question: sea "Krock" in X1 below for
his general l)ositiol].
Lien (11123-124): [In his reply Lien did not answer this question. lHe
referred to "any law enacted to deal with tie 'inability' problem"
and made no reference to constitutional amendment].
Payne (1112-17): [In his testimony at the hearing Payne did not
s)ecifically discuss this question: see "Payne" in XI below for
his general position].
P'eltason (1148-51): [Inl his reply Peltason did not .specifically answer
this question: see "Peltason" in X1 below for his general )ositionl.
Pritchett (P52-54): [In his reply Pritchett did not specifically answer
this question: see" Pritchett" in XI below for his general )Sition].
Pritchett (1168-77): [In his testimony at the hearing Priteltt (lid not
specifically answer this question: see "Pritchett" in X[ below for
his genert'il position].
Sparkman (118-12): [li his testimony at, the hearing Sparkman did not
specifically discuss this question: see "Sparkman'" in XI below for
his general position].
n. PEnSONS wHo INI)CA'rED TIIAT CONSTITUTIONAL AMEND3rlNT WAS
NECESSAIIY, ItEIA'FIVE 'ro QUESTIONS It AND IHI
Baily (P4): "These procedures [as described in Hl and IIl above]
would necessarily involve cost it ut iolmal change."
Finletter (1"28): [Under article 2, section 1, clause 6 of the Constitu-
tion] "Congress * * * is given tile power to act in the case of
the disability of both oflicials [President and Vice President] but
nothing is said about Congress ill the case where it is the Presi-
dent alone who is disabled. From this I think it inay be argued
that there was an intent, on the part of the Philadelphia 2Convee-
tion that (Congress should act [in the first, case but, not in the
second. ('ougressional definition of word "inability" might
violate principle of separation of powers. A Supreme Court
decision in an actual ease might be influenced by circumstances
at. the tinel. Nevertheless, I do think that tlie constitutional
argument is an imn)ortant one against any atteml)t to define the
term ' imbility'."
Sutherland (P62). "Your fourth question * * * raises the most seri-
ous problem. 'Inability' is so ill-provided for in tie Constitution
that the success of any system of supersession of the President,
if made only by act of Congress, will depend on its acceptance by
tlie officers of Government and the people. [One faction mlig.ht
favor the President's continuance in his functions, while another
opposed it, and] the Constitution gives the President a 4-year
teria. Might not his supporters assert with much force that a
nonconstitutional body was without constitutional power to dis-
place the President?"
Stutherland (1177-78): [lit his testimnolly at the hearing Sitherlarid
did Inot Se)CificallV discuss this question: see "Su themlaid" ill
XI blow for his gererill position].
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C. PEISONS WHO INDICATED THAT CONSTV'UTIONAL AMENDMENT WAS
NOT NECESSARY, RELATIVE 10 QUESTIONS 1I AND III
Brown (P5): "1 fail to see. any insurmountable constitutional prohibi-
tions relative to questions II and .II."
Corwin (Plo): "No constitutional prohibitions are pertinent to ques-
tions 2 and 3 so long as it is kept in mind that it is the Vice Pres-
ident and nobody else upon whom the duty falls to take over the
1)owes anmd duties of a disabled President."
Fairman (P20): "The limitation on the Supreme Court, drawn from
Article III [would make it necessary to amend the Constitution
if the Court's jurisdiction were to' be extended to include the
determination iof Presidential inability]. If it seemed good to
Congress to propose an amendment to make provisions for the
incidents of an tonic war, then one provision might well make
the Supreme Court the judge of P'esidential 'Inability'. If an
amendment is not to be sought," [Fairman proposed the estab-
lisiment by act, of Congress of an extraordinary Commission, as
dseiilid iln III above].
Fellian (P24): "I think a statute of the sort I have discussed iii
11 and Ill is perfectly constitutional. * * * [under] Article 1I,
section 1, clause 6 of the United States Constitution."
Hart (1130-33): [in his reply Hart did not specifically answer this
question: see "|art" i1uler' XI below for his general position].
hiart (1193-95. 97): [In his testimony at the hearing hlart discussed
lie Inetlhol of deternining disability, lie stated five assttmp-
tioms, including] " * * (3) that, it, is in the public interest that
there now b Ji'ovidled a definite method for determining prosi-
deiititl inability and its removal; (4) that Congress has within
limits the piOV er to provide such a method under the 'necessay
and proper' clause; * * *" [In discussing the proposal for
establishiuctit of a special body to perform these functions, with
members to be appointed by the Supreme Court, Iart supported
Congress' power to enact sich legislation under its constitutional
power as provided in article II, section 2, clause 2--relating to
the appointment of "inferior officers" (1194-95). At 1197 1I1a1t
included a draft of a proposed joint resolution incorporating his
proposals].
1lolcombe (P34): "I do not know of any constitutional prohibition
relative to questions no. 2 and no. 3 except those implied in the
basic principles of the separation of powers." [The question
seemed to Ilolcombe to be a political question and consequently
there would be no reason for appealing to the Supreme Court
from Congress' decision. This decision would seem to him to be
final].
Kalenbach (P44-45): "1 think that a congressional statute, in the
form of a joint resolution embracing the essence of the constitu-
tional terminology relative to devolution of presidential power in
the event of presidential inability antid expressive of the sense of
Congress, should" be einacteVd. It should be plcrianeut, rather
tha.ad hoe, in nature. * * * It is my opinion that Congress
has authority under the necessary and properclause to reinforce
the constitutional provision on this point by legislation of this
nature. * * * It is my belief that Congress icks authority to
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circumscribe in any way the term [inability] as it is found in this
clause of the Constitution. It may not delimit the causes from
which inability may be deemed to arise, or prescribe a period of
time during which the inability must persist before the devolution
of presidential power may occur. Nor may it specify a minimum
or maximum period of time during which the devolution of presi-
dential power shall be deemed effective. * * * a statute of Con-
gress can be directive and declatory of the sense of Congress, as
well as mandatory. * * * it would clearly be within the province
of Congress, at any time, to pass a concurrent resolution express-
ing its attitude in a situation giving rise to this question."
Kallenbach (H84 and 90-91): [In his testimony at the hearing Kallen-
bach did not, specifically discuss this question: see "Kallenbach"
in XI below for his general position].
Pennock (P52): "I fin- no constitutional prohibitions relative to
questions Ii and III."
Peters (H122): "There would appear to be ample authority under the
Constitution for Congress to enact legislation of the character
indicated above (see replies to 1, 11, an( II (H122)). However,
serious constitutional doubts would arise if legislation were to
provide for the determination of inability by an ad hoc body or
permanent commission."
Romani (P57-58): [In discussing a situation in which the President
is able to announce his disability, Romani recommended that
the powers and duties should devolve upon the Vice President
or the next person in line of succession]. "There appears to be
no constitutional prohibition against such a procedure. * * *
At the same time, it does not seem that any action by Congress
is necessary before a President could act in this manner. It
may be desirable, however, to have this procedure outlined either
in law or in constitutional amendment. Since it has been
recommended that an amendment be proposed to clarify the
status of successors during a period of Presidential inability,
this procedure could be contained in the same amendment.
[Romani recommended that the Vice President initiate and
make the determination as to his own succession in a case in
which the President was unable to do so]. * * * it seents that
the Constitution, now, gives this power of decision to the Vice
President. * * * It also seems that no legislation is necessary'
to recognize that such a power does already rest, with the Vice
President. Yet, as noted above, this procedure might, for
clarification, be incorporated into the general amendment con-
cerning Presidential inability."
Romani (H42): [Of the various proposals before the Committee for
consideration Romani favored adoption of the passage of (1) ajoint resolution, (2) an inability statute, or (3) a constitutional
amendment with provisions like those described above in his
reply to the questionnaire]. "Following the general line of
reasoning that I have stated * * * I would not think a consti-
tutional amendment necessary."
D. REPLY BY WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY
Crosskey (H99-119): [The witness in his testimony (H99-105) and
in his reply to the questionnaire (H105-119) stated and sup-
ported 0 proposal for dealing with cOe of Presideutial inability
which was quite unlike the proposals, of the: other experts. t-The
questions II-VIII in the queetionnaire were generally inappli-:
cable to Crosakey's proposal: see Il above for alsummarination
of this proposal]. "I seem to be in & minority of one in thinking
that some provision was made in reference to; this matter in 'the
Constitution of the United States, especially with respect to tha
determining of Presidential inability." (1199).
V. Shall dual authority, both to initiate the question and to determine
" the question, be vested in the same body?
Many persons who replied to the questionnaire or who appeared as
witnesses at the hearing did not answer this question directly, but in
most of such cases comparison of replies to questions II and III
yields the answer.
Thirteen persons, either specifically or by implication, took the
position that the same individual or body should initiate action and
make the determination. Twelve persons took the opposite view.
In one case (Crosskey) question V was not relevant, in view of the
particular proposals in II and 1II., o
A summary of the replies to the questionnaire and of comments made
in the testimony at hearings on the subject is presented below, under
the following headings:
A. Same individual. or body initiates and determines the
question.
B. Different individfials or bodies initiate and determine the
question.
C. Proposal by William W. Crosskey.
A. SAME INDIVIDUAL OR BODY INITIATES AND DETERMINES THE
QUESTION
Aikin (H121): [Aiken did not specifically separate the two duties-
to initiate a determination of inability and to make such a
determination but, by implication, both would be vested in
Congress. See III above.]
Corwin (P 16): "There is no reason why not, one purpose of such an
enquiry being to enlighten the Vice President as to his constitu-
tional duty and to protect him from imputations of overambition
and rashness."
Fellman (P24): "* * * I believe that the same body ought to have
authority both to initiate the question and determine its
merits * * *. It might be wise to authorize the Chief Justice
to take the initiative of setting the machinery in motion, but I
do not see why any one of the five important people * * * on
the committee could not request a meeting of the committee for
the purpose of making a decision."
Hart (P31-32): "At first glance it might seem desirable to have one
body initiate and another determine. But in this matter the
question of when to raise the question should be handled with the
same judicial discretion as the question of how to decide it. The
commissioners [see III above for description of the Commissioners
on Presidential Inability] should be authorized to investigate
upon their own motion with or without the formal or informal
suggestion of others and to make findings." [In his sketch from
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which a draft bill might be prepared, Hart included the above
provision in section (2)].
Hart, (H97): (tart did not specifically discuss this point, but his
revised draft of proposed legislation made no change in the allo-
cation of both ,owers (initiation and determination) to the Com-
missionters onl Iresidential Inability.]
lolcombe (P34): "I see no reason why the Congress should not
initiate the question as well as make the final determination
if the Vice President fails to act in good season."
Hoover (P35-1I-2): [Question not directly answered: by implica-
tion, "Yes"-tlie Cabinet.]
iowe (P35): [Question not directly answered: by implication, Con-
gress would both initiate and make the determination, but
Howe stated that lie saw "no reason why the Cabinet might not
initiate congressional action."]
Iluber (P3,-37): [This question was not answered, nor was it entirely
relevant in view of Huber's proposals in II. In so far as it
was applicable, the answer would lbe "Yes".]
Iyman (1150-60): [This question was not specifically answered, but
based upon his concrete proposals the answer was "Yes".]
Lien (11123): [Lien did not describe any separate process for initia-
tion of the determination of inability. Consequently, by impli-
cation, it would be vested in tie special commission, described
in III above, which lie proposed as the body for determining
the existence of inability.]
Peters (11122): "If some body or commission is to be provided for
I see no good reason for mot having it both to initiate the question
question and to determine it." [Peters did not, however, favor
such a body.] [Based on II and I1 above, Peters' answer would
be "Yes".]
Pritchett (P53-54): [Pritchett (lid not discuss the initiation and the
actual determination processes separately. (1) If the Presi-
dent was able to do so, lie would hinself take action, as described
in II and III, above. (2) If lie were unable to take action,
the Cabinet would do so, as described in II and III, above.
In each case, the sanie individual and agency would take the
initial action and make the determination.]
Pritchett (1174-75): [Pritchett offered one change in the proposal,
summarized above, which he included in his reply to the question-
naire. (1) Above was unchanged. (2) Instead of action by
the Cabinet, Pritchett proposed action by the Vice President,
after securing the advice of the Cabinet. In each case, the same
individual takes the initial action and makes the determination.]
Roinani (160) : [This question was not discussed, but Romani provided
a very simple procedure involving iuiiiouncenent that the Pre.ii-
dent was unable to exercise his powers and duties, such announce-
ment to be made by the President if lie was able to do so, or by
the Vice President 'if the President were unable. In either case,
the l)oWVenr and duties devolved upon the Vice President.]
Romani (1141-43. 45): [Roiani repeated the proposals summarized
above, and indicated willingness to recommend a procedure for
certifying Presidential inability to the Vice President, without
depriving tile latter of his constitutional authority to make the
final determination. See II above.]
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U. DIFFf RENT INDIVIDUALS O1 BODIES INITIATE AND DETURIMINE TIl
QUESTION
bailey (P4): "No" [see 1l and III].
Brown (1P5): [See 11 and Ill above. le recommended (1) initiation
by tlhe Cabinet and Vice President, or in case of physical dis-
ability only, the President; mnd (2) determination by the Vice
President, "members of the Cabinet, and the presiding officers of
the Jiouse and Senate.]
Fairman (P20): "Even supposing that to be objectionable, it has been
avoided by the method proposed above.' [See 11 and III above.]
Finletter (P28): "1 have suggested above [III at P27-281 that neither
authority be vested in any body."
Frelinghuyseii (134-35): [Tie plan proposed by Frelingliuysen--
-I. J. Res. 442--contained provision in See. III for Congress to
initiate tile in1(quiry into the President's disability, and Sec. IV
provided for determination of the question by the Supreme
Court. See It and 111, above.]
Kallenbach (P45--46): tIn the plan proposed by Kallenbaeh (1) if the
President is able to do so lie announces that. because of his in-
ability to exercise the powers and duties of his office, those funic-
tions shall devolve upon his constitutional or legal successor;
(2) if the President is unable to take such action, the Vice Presi-
dent (or other successor) with the advice of an Advisory Council,
announces his assumption of the Presidential powers and duties.
One (or two) member of the Advisory Council would also be
autholiized to initiate action by the Couicil, and Congress at any
time could pass i concurrent resolution expressing its attitude.
In any case, the actual determination would be made by the Vice
Presi(lent. (See II and IlI above for details)].
Kallenbach (H85-87): [In the statute which Kallenbach proposed at
the hearings there were alternative plans as follows:- (1) same
as (1) in the plan in his reply to the questionnaire; (2) if the
President is unable to take action as thus provided, the Vice
President shall notify a body consisting of the secretaries of the
ten Executive Departments, the President pro tempore of the
Senate end the Speaker of the House and, if this body by a
2/3rds vote finds that the President is unable to act, the presiden-
tial powers and duties shall devolve on the Vice President; and
(3) if the President is unable to take action as provided in (1),
Congress by a 2/3rds vote may pass a concurrent resolution noti-
fying the body described in (2) above, with action following as
described in (). (For full explanation, see II and III, above.]
Krock (H62-68): [In Ahe procedure advocated by Krock, initiation of
the determination of Presidential inability' would be vested in
any two members (of different political parties) of a.special
Inability Council; and determination of inability would be made
by majority vote of all inlenbers of the Council. (Detailed
procedures for both steps are described in I and III, above.)]
Payne (1116): [In Pa3id's bill (S. 2763) initiation by the President,
with notification to Congress, would result automatically in siC-
cession by the Vice President: if the Vice President was the
initiating agency, determination of inability would be made by
action of the Chief Justice and a medical panel, with notification
to Congress.]
39
40 ftP EI bnWT1Ab: iI'ABILIrTY
Peltason (P51): [Peltason proposed to vest initiationof determination
.of Presidential inability in Congress or in certain Congressional
leaders (see II above); and actual determination of inability in
the Supreme Court (see III above),]
Pennock (P52): [Pennock proposed initiation of the determination of
Presidential inability by either Congress or the Cabinet; and
actual determination either by the Congress with the concur-
rence of the Vice President, or'by the Cabinet.]
Sparkman (H9-li): ISparkman proposed that] "the Vice President,I, , the Cabinet, and the Congres all be allowed to start the inquiry
S in addition to the President himself. * * * "The final deter-
mination should be made by a group of persons" (not specifically
described.1
Sutherland (P62): "On the whole I think the Cabinet should perform
both functions."
Sutherland (178): [See II and III above: Sutherland proposed the
creation of a special body consisting of the Chief Justice, the
Secretaries of State and Defense, and the leaders of the President's
party in the Senate and House. This body would be called into
action by the Chief Justice or by any two members.]
C. PROPOSAL BY WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY
Crosskey (H99-119): [The witness in his testimony (H99-105) and in
his reply to the questionnaire (11105-119) stated and supported a
proposal for dealing with cases of Presidential inability which was
quite unlike the proposals of the other experts. The questions
II-VII in the questionnaire were generally inapplicable to Cross-
key's proposal: see IL above for a summarization of this pro-
posal.] "I seem to be in a minority of one in thinking that some
provision was made in reference to this matter in the Constitution
of the United States, especially with respect to the determining of
Presidential inability." (1199)
VI. ,Shall the determination of disability set forth the--
(a) Permanent nature of the disability?
(b) Temporary nature of te disability?(c) If temporary, extent of?
In few cases did the persons who replied to the questionnaire or
who appeared as witnesses at the hearing give definite "Yes," or "No"
answers to these questions, and in eleven cases there was no reply
and/or no discussion at the hearing. Eight persons expressed thejudgment that the permanent or temporary nature of the disability
should not be specified, in general because it would not usually be
possible to make such a determination. Six persons gave replies
which indicated the possibility and desirability of specifying the
nature or probable duration of the inability. In one case the sohtition
to the problem of disability which was proposed was a type which
made question VI irrelevant. '
A summary of the replies to the questionnaire and of comments
made in testimony at the hearing on the subject is presented below,
under the following headings:
A. Replies emphasizing the impossibility or undesirability of
indicating the permanent or temporary nature of Presidential
inability.
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B. Replies emphasizing the possibility or desirability of indi-
catinq the permanent or temporary nature of -Presidential
inability.,
C. Replies which (lid not contain an answer to thbisquestion,
and testimony in which it was not discussed.D. Proposal of William W,' Crosskey.
VI. Shall the determination of disability set forth the--
(a) Permanent nature of the disability f
(b) Temporary nature of the disabihty?(C) If temporary, ezMtC of?
A. REPLIES EMPHASIZING THE IMPOSSIBILITY OR UNDESIRABILITY OF
INDICATING THE PERMANENT OR TEMPORARY NATURE OF PRESI-
DENTIAh INABILITY
Fairman (P20): "Evidently the sorts of disability tinat would give
trouble are such as could not at the moment be determined to be
more than temporary."
Finletter (P28): "If the President or the Vice President were to assert
that ail infbility existed it should be recognized that the disability,
no matter how' serious ii. might appear at the moment,, might
prove to bc temporary."
Hart. (P30) [Ii discussing question I Hart concluded that no definition
of "inability" should be included in the statute which he recom-
mended because the reasonable meaning is clear in general, it,
would be difficult to anticipate every possible future situation,
and a definition in general terms would add so little as to be of
small use.] "The same objection arises with respect to writing a
definition of the duration of an inability." [Hart discussed the
two kinds of findings provided in his proposed legislation-fa
simple finding of "iuabihty", a finding of "permanent disability"
(but none of temporary3 disability' ), and a finding that "in-
ability" had been removed ("permanent disability' could not
be removed.) (P31)]
Hart (H97) (Hart made changes in his original proposal, as sum-
marized above, as stated in his reply to the questionnaire. In his
revised plan the Commissioners] "* * * giving all reasonable
weight to the opinion of the President, [may] declare in writing
that they are satisfied by evidence which shall include the evidence
of physicians that, the President * * * is by reason of infirmity
of mind or body unable for the time being to discharge the rowers
and duties of his office or that they are satisfied by evidence that
the President. is unable to discharge these powers cnd duties
because he is for some definite cause not, available for their dis-
charge * * * until it is declared in like manner that the dis-
ability has been removed because the President has so far re-
covered his health as to warrant the resumption of the discharge
of his powers and duties or because he has become available for
the discharge thereof, as the case may be, or until the term for
which the President was elected expires?' (the Vice President
shall serve as Acting President].
Holcombe (P34): "I see no reason for recognizing any disability in
advance as permanent, except in the case of death. In other
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cases, it is a fair presumption at the outset that the disability
may happily be only temporary."
Kallenbach (P46): [Kallenbach provided for all Advisory Council
(see II above) which was authorized to] "go only so far as to
make a finding that, in its judgment, circumstances have arisenjustifying the operation of th'constitutional rule. It. cannot be
invested with authority to pass upon the 'permanent' or 'tem-
porary' nature of the inability; and it can find inability to exist
only if there is inability in the constitutional sense * * *. Tile
devolution of powers in such a situation must be complete; hence
the Advisory Council could not recommend a partial devolu-
tion * * * in order to accommodate a partial disability of the
President. * * * the impeachment procedure, by implication,
is the sole and exclusive provision of the Constitution on the
point of removal of a President. Furthermore, to authorize a
body of this character to make a determinative finding oii the
permanent or temporary character of a President's inability
would amount to a restriction upon the judgment of the succeed-
ing officer regarding what lie alone has final authority to decide,
i. e., his constitutional duty to exercise the powers and functions
of tile President only during that time in which the President is
actually unable to exercise them."
Kallenbach (1187): [Kallenbach did not discuss this question at tile
hearings. His draft statute (d) and (e) provided that; if the
Vice President or the Congress request tile opinion of the advisory
body provided in those sections, it, must be for) "sufficidnt cause
to believe that the President is, for a specified reason or reasons,
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office."
Krock (1163): [Krock proposed a complete procedure, as described in
11 and 111, above. This included the use of on advisory medical
panel, designated by the Surgeon General of the United States,
which reported its majority findings to the special Inability
Council as a basis for its determination of Presidential inability.
Tile p anel's report was to be niade public.)
Peters (11122): "When the President determiness his own inability
he should not have to state the nature or extent of disability.
When the Vice President determines that there is inability, the
fact in the usual case would le a iMatter of public knowledge,
but it would appear advisable for him to declare in a public
maiinner to be specified by law what tile niature of te disability
appears to be."
Sutherland (P62): "I think the answer is in the negative."
Sutherland (177-84): [This question was not diseissed.]
It. REP'LI ES EMii[ASIZING TiE POSSIBILITY On DESIAiLITY (OF INDI-
CATING riH PEIiMANENT Oil TEMPORARY NArITRE OF PRiESID'NTIAi
INAII TY'
Aikin (11121): [Aikin prol)osed a joint resolution authorizing Congress
to act alt nY time t)V t'oncu''ent resolution (1) to (e('laii'e the
existence of i nal)ility,'andi "(2) to declare tie prospective dura-
liou of tihe disability."
BRilvy (4): "'The deterinination should set, forth (a), (b) and (v)."
Bown (Ms), "I think it would be advisable to set forth the nature
of thi disability ill 1a1l iiistanices."
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Corwin (P16): "Yes, if Congress so desires, its power under 't e
necessary and( proper clause to inquire or to authorize inquiries
into situations which involve a widespread public iziterest being
practically unlimited."
Felhnan (1'24): "The committee should be free to declare that tihe
President is permanently disabled, if the facts warrant such a
finding. * * * If the disability is temporary, the committee
should be authorized by the same procedure utilized to make a
finding of disability (action by a special committee: see III
above], to make a finding that the President is sufficiently well
to resume his duties and functions."
Peltason (P151): "The Supreme Court [see III above] could be author-
ized to stipulate whether the disability is of a permanent or
temporary nature. * * *"
C. REPLIES WnICII DID NOT CONTAIN AN ANSWER TO TillS QUESTION,
AND TiSTIMONY IN WHICH IT WAS NOT DISCUSSED
Frelinghuysen (-133-35, 38-39): [The plan proposed by Freling-
huysen--1. J. Res. 442-contained no provisions concerning the
setting forth of the nature of the disability.]
Hoover (1)35 and 1(1-2): [Question was not answered]
Howe (P35-36): [Question was not answered)
Iluber (P36-:37) : [Question"was not answered, nor was it particularly
relevant in view of Hluber's proposals ill III.]
Ilylnan (1147-60): [Question was not discussed at the hearing.]
Iien (11123-124): (Question was not answered]
Payne (1112-17): [Question was not discuss( at tle hearing]
Peninoek (152): [Question was not answered]
Prichett (P52-54): [Question was not answered]
Prichett (1168--77): [Question was not discussed at the hearing]
Homani (l'54-61): [Question was not answered]
lomani (114,0-46): [Question was not discussed at the hearing]
Splarkman (118--12): [Question was not discussed at the hearing]
1). I'IOPOSAL OF WiIIAM W. CHOSSKEY
Crosskcv (1199--119): [The witness in his testimony (1199--105) and
ill llis reily to tie ( uestionnaire (11105-119) stated and SupI)orted
a pronosa for dealing with cases of Presidential inability which
was quite unlike tite proposals of the other ex pelts. Tfhe (ties-
tions 11-VII ill the (qLestiolnaire vWere generalIy .11inpl)icable to
Crosskev's proposal: see 1I above for suulnarizatiol of Ilmis
p'oposl .1 "1 seem to ibe in a minority of one in thinking that
some l)rovision Nwas made in reference to this mattel il he
Constitution of the United States, especially with respect to tile
determining of Presidential inab)ility." (1199)
VII. If teirlmrar, wh o raises the qu(stion that the disability hes based d
to e.rist? Once raised, wto vhall make the deteruliboitioii of
The 26 answrs to this question colitaiId sudh a wide variety of
proI)OS'lh that analysis does not vield particularly significant results.
The followinl, tahlution serves t; clarify the situltioi to slne ixtellt:
PRIE NTIAL INABILITY
(a) In 16 cases, persons proposed that the same individual or body
should raise the question and make the determination.(1) The. President (Finletter, Iymnin, Kallenba-h, Payne,
Peters, Pritchett, and Romani).
(2) A special body (Fellman, Hart, Krock, and Sutherland).
(3) Contress (Aikin and Howe).(4) Cabinet (Iloover).
(5) Supreme Court (Peltason).
(6) President and Vice President (Huber).
(b) In eight cases, persons proposed that different individuals or
bodies shouId raise the question and make the determination (Bailey,
Brown, Corwin, Fairmnan, Frelinghuysen, lolcombe, Lien, and Pen-
noeck).(c) Sparkman did not discuss this question as a witness at the hear-
ing, and Crosske 's proposal was of a type which made this question
inapplicable.
(d) Analysis of the nine different methods proposed for initiation.
(1) The, President (Corwin, Fairman, Finletter, Frelinghuysen,
Hyman, Kallenbach, Lien, Payne, Peters, Pritchett, and Romani).
(2) Special body (Bailey, IPellman, Krock, and Sutherland).
(3) Congress (Aikin and Howe).
(4) Cabinet (Hoover).
(5) Supreme Court, (Peltason).
(6) P"resident and Vice President (Huber).
(7) P'resident or Vice President (Holcombe).
(8) President or Cabinet (Pennock).
(9) Cabinet and Vice President (Brown).
(e) Analysis of the eight different methods proposed for determina-
tion.
(1) The President (Finletter, Hyman, Kallenbach, Payne,
Peters, Pritchett, and Romani).
(2) Special body (Brown, Corwin, Fairman, Fellman, Hart,
Kroek, and Sutherland)
(3) Congress (Aikin, Holcombe, Howe).
(4) Supreme Court (Bailey, Frelinghuyscn, Pcltason).(5) Cabinet (Hoover).
(6) Congress and Cabinet (Pennock).
(7) President and Vice President (luber).
(8) Congress or Supreme Court (Lien).
Brief summaries of the proposals of persons who replied to the
questionnlaire and/or appeared as witnesses at the hearing appear
below, in alphabetical order.
Aikin (11121): "The joint resolution (see Ill above] wouli similarly
provide for the adoption of a * * * concurrent resolution which
would declare the disability at an end or, in ai appropriate case,
extend the effective period of the earlier resolution." [For ie-
tails (oncerning such a concurrent resolution sce III above].
Bailey (P): "The Supreme Court, again acting upon the recom-
mendation of the ad loc body referred to above tit III."
Brown (P5): "If temporary, the question of cessation of disability
should be raised by ithe Cabinet and the Vice President]. * * *
Determination of cessation of temporary disability should be
made by" [the Vice President, the Cabine t, and the presiding
officers cf the House and Senate].
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Corwin (P17): "The President may undoubtedly raise the question,
which should be determined by the same body 4as found him pre-
viously to be (lisablod." I 
•
Crosskey (199-119): [The witness in his testimony (H99-105) and
in his reply to the questionnaire (HI05-119) stated and sup-
ported a proposal for dealing with cases of Presidential inability
which was quite unlike the proposals of the other experts. The
questions II-VII in the questionnaire were generally inapplicable
to Crosskey's proposal: see 11 above for a summarization of this
proposal]. "I seem to be in a minority of one in sinking that
some provision was made in reference to this matter in the Con-
titution of the United States, especially with respect to the de-
termining of Presidential inability." (H99).
Fairman (P20): "The President seeks to resume the powers and
duties of his office. If the temporary place-holder steps aside,
that is the end of the matter. [But if a determination of the
matter is necessary] the body selected to make the determination[see III above] A'ould be the appropriate body to determine
whether the disability was at an end."
Fellmian (P24): "If the disability is temorr* * anN member of
the committee [see 111 above] slioisd b uut horized'to raise the
question that thre disability has ceased to exist. Once the ques-
tion ihas been raised, it sb6uld be determincd.f by a majority vote.
* * * * * * a finding that. thle disability has ended should be
made in writing, on the basis of evidence, including the evidence
of physicianss"
Finletter (P 28): "Thle proper person ***should be thle President."
Frelinghuysen (H38): [See. 11V--Frelinghuysen's bill-H. J. Res. 442]
"(provides that if the powers and dutfes of the President devolve
on the Vice President, pursuant to sections 11 and III the exercise
of these powers and duties shall not be resumed by the. President
until the Supreme Court, ol the request of the Pzesident, 'deter-
mines that tile President is able to discharge the powers and
duties of his office.' "
Hart (P31-33): "Trho phrase ***'until the (disability be removed,'
refers grammatically to the further succession byond the Vice
President; but the intent sees reasonably to ap lv it, back also
to the succession of the Vice President. If an rnaAl bity turns out
to be genuinely temporary the President should by , finding of
the commissioners be restored to his authority." '[Tile commis-
sioners referred to were a special body to be appointed by the
Supreme Court. In the legislation proposed by Hart, (P32-33)
sections (4)-(8) contained detailed provision for action by the
Commissioners in cases of "inability" and "temporary disabil-
ity."]"
Hart (1-197): [In the joint resolution which Hart proposed as a witness
at the hearing, lie continued to support a prvision for a special
body appointed by the Supreme Court. This body was author-
izcd to act, in the same manner provided for determining that
inability exists, to determine that the disability had been re-
moved]. . .
Hlolcombe (P34): "* * * same as answers to no. 2 and no. 3. The
Vice President may raise the question whether disality has
ceased to exist, but,, whether he does o not, in my opinion it is
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the Congress which should mr ;"e the detemllinatiom of cessation.
Of course, there is the possibility that the President himself may
raise the question. In that cast, also if there should be a differ-
ence of opinion between him and the Vice President, it woul be
the Congress that would eventually have to decide whether the
disability had ceased to exist. I draw this conclusion from
article I, section 8, clause 18.
Hoover (P35): "In my view the determination of disability and its
termination should rest with the Cabinet."
Hoover (11-2): [Question was not answered].
Howe (P35-36). IThis question was not directly alnswered: hlowe
stated his belief "that the Congress possessts today the sole
power * * * to assert an exclusive authority over the matter
of a President's 'inability' " which implies Congressional power
to declare that the "inability" has cease(l to exist].
Iluber (P35-36): {'|his question was not answered, but judging from
Huber's proposals in III the "administrative team" of President
and Vice President would make the decision].
Hlyman (1153-50) In his testimony Iyman expressed his approval
of the draft measure prepared by the counsel and the staff
director of the Committee (1[53-54) providing that] "See. 4. If
the powers and duties of the Predisent devolve upol any person
pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of this resolution, the exercise
of such powers and duties shall be resumed by the President
upon the President's announcement of his ability and intention
thereupon to resume * * *. I was speaking a mnmlent ago
about the problem of a Vice President's refusing to yield to a
President who had recovered from his disability. One solution,
of course, might lie ini a suit brought by a private person who
Claimed ihewas injured because the ice President exercised unlaw-
ful powers. The question of the President's recovery might then be
decided as an incident to the suit. Yet this does not cover the
real ground for concern; namelyy. in the field, say, of foreign
affairs, where no private person can put his finger on a specific
personal injury, but. where the V ice President, clinging overly
long to Presidential powers might injure the national interest as
a whole. Perhaps, * * * the fact that the President had the
vigor to press his demands against the Vice President would in
itself be conclusive proof to the people, to his party, and above all
to Congress with the impeachment weapon at hand, that the
President had recovered."
Kallenbach (P46-47): " * * * every inabilitv in the constitutional
sense should be treated alike, 'as one w hich in the course of
events may disappear by reason of removal of its co use or causes.
In providing for deteriiiination of when a Presidential inability
has ceased anld the temporarily displaced President may reassume
his role as President, the olicers most immediately concerned,
viz, the President and the officer who has temporarily assumed
t m powers and duties of the Presidency, must. be recognized as
the ones empowered by the Constitution to make the decision.
If these officers [cannot. reach a decision] there is nothing that
Congress. can (1o, by state ate, to provide for ai authoritative and
immediate resolution of the. issue. Eventually it might fall to
the courts to pass upon this question. * * * [for theii' decision
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judicially in a concrete case which turns upon a question of
which claimant's acts shall be recognized as those of the lawful
Chief Executive. I see no reason, however, why Congress may
not, by statute, provide by way of directive, that the President
or any other officer in the line 6f the Presidential succession who
assumes Presidential powers under the succession rule may refer
the question of the removal or cessation of his disability to the
above-described Advisory Council in order to obtain its recoi-
miendation and political sanction for the President's resumption
of his official powers and duties. The obtaining of such advice
cantotbe made mandatory upon him, nor can tie findings and
recommendation of the Advisory Council be made finally deter-
minative of his right, to resume the powers and duties of the
office of President."
Kallenbach (1187): [In the draft statute which Kallenbach presented
at the hearings, Section (d) provided that, after the presidential
powers have devolved upon the Vice President, he] "shall dis-
charge them until the President notifies the Congress, by written
communication made to the Speaker of the House aid to the
President pro tempore of the Senate, of his ability to reassume the
powers and duties of his office, or until a new President is in-
augurated."
Krock (1163): [Krock proposed a complete procedure, as described in
II and 111, above. At H63 he proposed that, if the powers and
duties of the Presiddncy devolved on the Vice President, the
latter should exercise them. "until, on a reversal of the proce-
dure, a suggestion l)y two members of the Inability Council (pro-
vided they are of (diferent political parties) that the Presidential
inability has been removed shall be adopted by a majority vote
of the 'Council on the finding of a new panel of leaders of the
medical profession * * *"
Lien (11123): "As a safeguard against any arbitrary or corrupt action
by the Cabinet or Board or Commission, authority might be
given either to Congress or to the Supreme Court to take action
on the petition of the President (1) to declare null and void an
order declaring a state of inability or (2) to terminate the period
of inability."
Payne (1116):""It is my feeling that this should be accomplished
simply by the President notifying the Congress in writing that
he was resuming the responsibilities of his office."
Peltason (P51): "The Supreme Court [see III above could be au-
thorized * * * on it.s own motion to restore the President to
office when the disability has disappearedd"
Pennock (P52) : "I think that any determination of disability should
be reviewable at the instance either of tihe President or the
Cabinet; and that when review is called for, the determination of
cessation should be made by the Congress and the Cabinet, re-
quiring a majority of each."
Peters (11122-123): "The President in most cases should himself de-
termine when the disability ceases to exist. If, however, lie is in
the power of enemies of the United States at the time lie purports
to nmke such a (letermination the statute should provide that
such purported determination is not, to be considered his act or
determination since made under duress." [Peters did not answer
the question with respect to the situation in which the Vice Presi-
dent would have made the determination of inability].
Pritchett (P53-54): "In accordance with the point of view already
expressed, this decision should be made by the President himself.
Whenever, on the basis of medical advice and his own judgment
and knowledge of his capacities, h determined that he was able
to resume the burdens of the Presidency, he should by written
statement terminate the Vice President's temporary status and
himself resume the powers and duties of the Presidency * * *
[This was incorporated as Sec. 3 of the draft bill proposed by
Pritchett]. When the President determines that his inability
has been terminated, and that lie is capable of exercising the
powers and duties of the office, he shall so notify the Congress in
writing, and tile powers and duties of tile office shall immedi-
atelv revert, from the Vice President, serving as Acting President,
to the President."
Pritchett (H69-71): "* * * I suggest that there is one principle on
which everyone is agreed; namely, that a President who is forced
to give up his office by inability should be able to reclaim it when
and if the inability passes away * * * The Constitution specif-
ically" recognizes that a constitutional disability may )e removed
• * * [Ili the draft legislation propose(l by Pritclett, section 3
provided as follows--] 'When the President determines that his
inability has been terminated, and that he is capable of exercising
the Powers and duties of the office, lie shall so notify Congress in
waiting, and the powers and duties of the office shall immediately
revert from the Vice President, acting as President, to the
President.' " (1171-72). .
Romani (P59-60): [This question) "can be handled simply by pro-
viding that the President shall make this decision. W\ hen lie is
able, after consultation with whomever he desires, he shall an-
nounce his resumption of the Presidential prerogatives, and this,
in itself, shall end the role of the Vice President act ing as President.
In the event, however, that the President is permanently disabled,
the Vice President shall continue to function in an acting capacity
until a new President is elected * * * [Romnani proposed a con-
stitutional amendment, section 4 of which provided-] If the
powers and duties of the President devolve upon the Vice Presi-
dent pursuant to section 2 or 3 of this article, the exercise of such
powers and duties shall he resumed by the President upon his
announcement of his al)ility and intention thereupon to resume
thein."
Ronmnni (1144): "To tile objection that the President might be unable
to act rationally, and that either lie or the Vice President would(
dispute the other's right to exercise the )owers, tile answer is
that this type of situation presents a justifiable issue which may
be decided by time courts in the normal manner. * * * It, would
be a justiciable issue and would not be political."
Sparkman (H8-12): [This question was not discussed at tile hearing].
Sutherland (P62): "I think I would leave terminatioji of disability for
determination by the Cabinet. * * * But. here again on has to
assume acceptaiice by all concerned of the decision with reason-
able cooperation, in the absence of a constitutional amendment."
Sutherland (H78): "The procedure for determining the end of in-
ability could be the same as for determining its existence." [See
48 PRESIDENTIAL* INABILITY
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
III above: Sutherland recommended at H78 the creation oft a
special body consisting of the Chief Justice, the Secretaries of
State and Defense, and the leaders of the President's party in
the Senate and House].
VIII. In the event of a finding of temporary disability, does the Vice
President succeed to the powers and duties of the office or to the
office itself?
The majority opinion was that in the event of a finding of temporary
disability, tle Vice President succeeds only to the powers and duties of
the office. One person favored the view that the Vice President suc-
ceeds only to the powers and duties, but posted out that precedent
has established tie alternative 'View. Another regard the President
and tile Vice President as an administrative team, with the latter
being able to make any or all decisions in the case of presidential
inability. Two thought that the matter should be left to be deter
mined by the particular situation, and two others did not answer the
question directly.
A summary of the replies appears below under the following
headings:
A. Replies expressing the view that the Vice President succeeds
only to the powers and duties of the office.
i. Replies expressing other concepts.
C. Replies which oppose taking action on the question at the
present time.
D. Replies in which there was no answer to the question.
A. REPLIES EXPRESSING THE VIEW THAT TilE VICE PRESIDENT SUCCEEDS
ONLY TO TIE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE OFFICE
Bailey (P4): "* * * only to the powers and duties of the office."
Brown (P5): "* * * to tihe powers and duties of the office."
Corwin (P17): "* * * succession on account of the temporary 'ina-
bility' of the President is obviously something different [from
succession in consequence of death] antl would not, necessarily,
signify succession to the office of President and hence could, and
to my mind should, terminate with the disability which gave rise
to it."
Crosskcy (H110): "* * * I think the answer to your question VIII
ought to be that, in any case of temporary 1residential inability,
the Vice President is intended by the Constitution merely 'to act
as President' until the President's inability terminates; he is not
intended 'to succeed to the Presidency.' "
Fairman (P20-21): "It seems to me that a Vice President acting in
the Presidential Office during the temporary 'Inability' of the
President would be only the Acting President."
Fdllnan (P25): "The language of the Constitution, that the Vice
President succeeds to the powers end duties of the President., or
acts as President, or exercises the office of President, supports the
view that it was not intended that lie should become President."
Finletter (P29): "I should think there would be ground for arguing
[that the Vice President succeeds) only to the powers and duties
rather than to the office."
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Frelinghuysen (1133) '"Tlie powers and duties [of -the office of, Presi-
.(.dent-] * * would devolve on the Vice President, and not the
office itself" [in tile case of temporal' or permanent inability].
Hart (P31): "* * * Vice President should exercise the office of Presi-
dent wider the title of President pro tempore (or Acting
President * * *).,
Hart (97): [Later, in testimony at hearings before the committee,
Hart presented a revised Joint Resolution which did not dis-
tinguish between "permanent" and "temporary" disability. It
provided that for the period during which the President was
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his Office) "* * *
those powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice Presi-
dent of the United States under the title of the Acting President
of the United States of America."
Holcombe (P34)' "* * * to the powers and duties of the office and
not to the office itfsL"?'
Hloover (P35, H1-2): " * * the executive powers should be exc-
cuted b the Vice President during any such period" [of inability
of the President to serve-whether temporary or permanently.Ill1).
Hyman (1153): "* section 3 of the 20th amendment in the Con-
stitution clearly separates the powers and office of the Presi-
dency. [n this section, the amendment, provides that if a Presi-
dent shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the
beginning of his term or if the President elect shall have failed
to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as President
until a President shall have qualified. None of this would have
any meaning if the powers and office of the Presidency, on the
Webster theory, were inseparable. It has meaning oAly if the
Vice President, acting as President until a duly elected Presi-
dent shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, exercised the
powers but not the office of the Piesident." Under this view,
the duration of the inability would not afTect t ie procedure.]
Kallenbach. (P47): "Any succession by the Vice President to the
Presidency, as I read the Constituton, is only to the powers and
duties of the office of President."
Kallenbach (1190): [The Constitutional amendment which Kallen-
bach proposed stated that] "If the President should, for any
reason, become unable to discharge the powers and ditties of his
office in the manner which the public interest requires and
necessitates, the powers and duties of the office shall devolve
upon the Vice President, who shall then act as President until
the disability be removed or his term of office shall expire."
Krock (1163): "* * * the powers and duties of the Presidency shall
devolve on the Vice President" [until a finding is made that the
Presidential inability has been removed].
Payne (-113): "1* * * it seems to me that the arguments holding that
the framers of the Constitution (lid 1not, in the event of Presi-
dential inability, [whether permanent or temporary was not,
specified) intend the Vice President to succeed to the title of
President, but only to exercise the powers and duties is the most
compelling. * *ite.
Pennoek (P52): - * only to the powers and duties of thle office."
Peters (11123): " tot the powers and (ditties of the office and not to
thle office itself."
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Pritchett (P53): "It should be possible for the President to.devolvo
his powers and duties en the Vice President in the complete,
constitutional sense, for such a temporary period, and then to
resume them whei his disability had passed.'
Ptitchett (1168477): [No distinction was made between temporaryy
andl permanentnt" disability. In any finding of inability, tfha
powers and duties'of thec President shall devolve upon the Vice
Sparkman (HO): "Once the question (of judging whether the President
is disabled-either permanently or temporarily] is affirmatively
determined, it seems quite clear that the Viee Presidt, nt is obli-
tredI by the Constitution to assume the powers and duties of the
fc)mce of President for the duration of the disability, not extending,
of course, beyond thte term to whieli elected."
Sutherland (P-12): "In ease of disability the Vie President s -ould
merely perform, the duties, because the disability may be re-move~l.
Sutherland (1179): [Sutherland referred to the problem concerning t h,
temporary or permanent superseding of the President, and
expressed approval of a stipulation that] "* * * only while the
President is sick or otherwise unable to act the Vice President
acts; and when the President becomes well or is otherwise re-
stored, the Vice President steps (own."
B. REPLIES EXPRESSING OTHER CONCEPTS
Romani (506): "It. is suggested, then, that a first step in resolving this
issue should be action to declare explicitly that any officer tem-
porarily assuming the duties of the Presid'ency does so only in an
acting capacity, an( that the President, after recovery, resumes
these powerls."
Romani i 140): "A second matter is the status of the Vice President
(or any other officer in line of succession) who assumes the powers
and duties of the presidency for a temporary period. A proper
reading of the Constitutioi leads me to believe that the Vice
President only acts as President and is displaced when the Presi-
(lent resumes Is powers and duties. Constitutional precedent,
however, has con fused and complicated the issue. * * * The
assumption of the Office by Tyler established a procedure which
has been followed in later instantes of )residential death. From
this has developed the attitude that the Vice President cannot
temporarily discharge the President's powers when the latter is
unable to do so. * * * It, appears that no legislation establishing
a procedure for meeting this problem can be effective until either
the original intent of the framers is restored and made clear or
there is. at least, a clarification of the Vice President's status when
lie acts for the Chief Executive during the latter's inability."
luber (P37): "Consequently, it seems best that the President and
Vice President form an administrative team, with the President
in the leadership position but the Vice President able to make
any or all decisions in the case of Presidential incapacity and
responsible to the electorate both for the decision as to incapacity
and for the decisions lie makes while acting on the policy level."
I.
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C. ItIEP:I, IS WHICH OPPOSE TAKING ACTION ON THE QUESTION AT THE.
PRESENT TIKM
Aikin (11121): "* * * whether a Vice President succeeds to the office
of the President or merely to the duties of that office is one of no
great moment * * * Congress would be advised to utse the
language of Article 11, section I, clause 6 of the Constitution and
permit experience to supply the meaning."
Howe (P36): "It is far wiser to leave sonie questions unsettled for in
doing so we preserve for later generations the power to resolve
their own problems in accordance with their own needs. * * *
I therefor believe it unwise to seek a present resolution of" tthis
question].
D. TEPLIES IN WHICH THERE WAS NO AN-SWEIR TO TIlE QUESTION
Lien (11123-12-1): [Question not directly answered]
Peltason (P48-51): [Question not directly answered!
IX. I)) the erutt (f a fdiql; of lpermwnefd disability, does the V ice
lPr'resil .-O c('d,' to the )H)U.ers md (Pities of the office or to the
office ib.e.f?
Whereas in Ihe event o a finding of temporary disability, a strong
majority favored the the view thlut tie Vice President suie&eeds only
to the powers ant duties 0i the office (see VII above), with respect
to a finding of periialelit disability, only a bale majority adhered
to this vew. Six persons believed that in this case, the Vice President
succeeded to tOw office of President. One oler person was of this
opinion when lie replied to the (Iuestiolillaire, but revised his opinion
at the hearings, in favor of the majority view. Again one person
regarded the President and tile Vice 1President as an aministrative
team, with the hitter being able to make any or all decisions in the
case of presidential inability, ald two others thought the matter
should be left for future deitermIination. In two cases the question
was not directly answered.
A summary of tei replies appears below:
A. Rejplies expressing th iew that the Vice President succeeds
olyN to the powers andduties of the office.
IA. Replies expressing the view that the Vice President succeeds
to the office of the President itself.
C. Replies expiCssing other concepts.
I). Replies which believe the mattel' should be left for future
deterlliltition.
E. Replies in wlhiich there was no answer to the question.
A. REPLIES EXIESSIN Tilt', VIEW THAT TE VICE IIESIDENT SUCC,'LI)S
ONLY TO TilE POWERS AND DUTIES OF TiE OFFICE
Brown (1,1): '* * * to the powers and duties of the office.''
Finletter ('29): "I would incline to the same view [to the powers and
duties. rather thall the office] ill the case of a perllanent disa-
bility. There is always the possibility thiat at disability which
seems to be permanent would prove in'fiwt not to be so.
2
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Frelinghuysenl (1133): "The p powers and duties [of thie office of Presi-
dent] * * * wvolIld devolve on the. Vice President, andH lit tile
office itself" [in the case of temporary or permanent inability],
Hart (P31) (-197): [In his reply to the questionnaire, Hart, stated
that in the event of a hlaidig of permanent disability] "the Vice
President wouhl become Presi(lentl, tle. Vice ]Presi(lenCey wiouilI
become vacant, and the person found to be permanently disabled
would cease to be President. Nor could this finding be reversed
or modified during the remainder of the term." (P31). [Later,
in testimony at hearings before the committee, he pointed out
the defects of his earlier proposal. The revised Joint Resolution
presented at this time did not distinguish between "permanent"
and temporaryr" disability. It provided that for the period
(luring which tfhe P'esident was uniable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office] * * * those powers and duties shall be
discharged by the Vice President of the United States under the
title of the Acting President of the United States of America."(1107). ,
Hoover (P35,111-2):•"* * * the executive powersshould e executed
by the Vice President during any such period" [of inability of the
President to serve, preslumaly, either temporarily or per-
manentlyl
I lyman (1-153): "~**sectioni 3 of the 20th anendlneit in the Con.-
stitution clearly selparltes tile powers and office of tile Presi-
denev. In this section the amendment provides that if a Presi-
(lent' shall not, have been chosen before the time fixed for the
l)emning of his term or if the President-elect shall have failed to
q,1, nifv then the V;e Piesidtlnt-elect shall act as President until
a President shall have quiaified. None of this would have any
meaning if the powers and office of the Presidency. on the Webster
theory, were inseparable. It. has meaning only if the Vice
PresiLent, acting as President until a duly elected 'resident shall
have leien chosen or shall have qualified, exercised the powers but
not the office of tl President."
Kalhnbach (147): '* * * in no case should the Vice President be
deemed to have beconiie President. by reason of either a permanent,
or lempolrary inability of the President * * *" 
.
Millenbaeh (1190): [The constitiutional amendment which Kallenbach
presented lit the hearings provided that] "If the President should
fori any reason, heorne limable to discharge the powers and liduties
of his'office in the manner which the public interest requires and
necessitates, the powers and duties of the office shall devolve upon
the 'i'ee President, who shall then act as P'resid.ent. until the dis-
abih tv ho removed or his term of office shall expir".'
Kroek (11113): "* * * the powers aid duties of thelt Presidency shall
devolve on the \Nice President'' [until a finding is made that the
Presidenltial inability has been removed].
Payne (H13). "'* * *. it seems to ti' that the arguments holding that
tie franiers of the Constlitution did not, in tile event of Presidential
inability, [whether permanent or temporary" was not speeifiedj
intend ihe Vice President to succeed to tile title of President, but,
only to exercise the powers and duties is the most complell-
nilg. , * ti1'eirmoek (l'52) : "* * * omlv to thle piowers and duties of the office.''
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Peters :(H 123): " * t t he powers and duties of the office and not
to tile office itself."
Pritchett (P53-54) (H68-77): [Pritchett's reply to tile questionnaire
did nott differentiate clearlybetween the situations of temporaryv"
and "pernenint" digiflifty, but it was implied that the .Vice
President succeeds only to the powers and autics, and not the
'office$ of the President, so long as the latter is alive. (P53-54).
He made no further distinction between the two situations when
he testified at hearings later. His view appeared to be that in
any finding of inability, the powers and duties of the President
shall devolve upon theVice President. (H68-77)].
Romani (1159): "In the event * * * that the President is perma-
nently disabled, the Vice President shall continue in an acting
capacity until a new President is elected."
Romani ([45): * * there is a need to clarify the status of any
officer assuming the powers and duties of the President wlien
the latter is disabled, [presumably either temporarily or perma-
nentlyl indicating that such officer only acts as tile President."
Sparkmai ([19): "Once tie question [of judging whether the Presilnet
is disabled-either permanently or temporarily] is affirmatively
determined, it seems quite clear that the Vice President is obli-
gated by the Constitution to assume the powers and duties of the
Office of President for the duration of the disability, not extending,
of course, beyond the term to which elected."
Sutherland (P62): "* * * the Vice President should only become
President in Case of death, resignation, or removal. In case of
disability the Vice President should merely perform the duties,
because the disability may be removed." '
Sutherland (1179): [At the hearings, Sutherland referred to the prob-
lem concerning the temporary or permanent superseding of tile
President, an expressed approval of a stipulation that] *
only while the President is sick dr otherwise unable to act the
Vice President acts; and when the President becomes well or is
otherwise restore(, the Vice President steps down."
B. REPLIES EXPRESSING THE VIEW THAT THEK VIC. PRESIDENT SUCFEDS
TO Till' OFFICE OF PRESIDENT ITSELF
Bailey (1-4). "* * * to the office itself."
Corwii (P17): "Oi account of the fact that hitherto all Vice Presi-
dents have succeeded to 'the powers and duties' of the Presidency
in consequence of the death of the President, they have also
succeede(I to the office itself."
Crosskev (11110): "* * * I find it hard to conceive how, looking to
the future, anfy Presidential inability call be found to be permina-
mient, except ini the ease of death. * * However, assuring there
can be such a case, I think the Vice President was intene(l, il,
such a case, to act as President until the end of the particular
Presidential term concerned * * *"
Fairman (P21): "Yes" [Vice President succeeds to tie Office].
Fellnan (P25-26): "If a finding of permanent disabilityy is made, I
should think the Vice President would succeed to the office itself,
and not merely to its powers and duties. * * *"
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lolcombe (P34) q' * uestion has been -settled at; least' by im-
plication by the precedent established by John ''yler" upon
itarrison's death, fyler assumed the office of the Prsidont].
C. REPLY EXPRESSINO ANOTHER'CONCEPT
Huber (P37): "* * * it s~ems'best that- the President and Vice Presi-
dent form an administrative team, with the President, in the
leadership position but the Vice President able. to make any or
all decisions in the case of Presidential incapacity and responsible
to the electorate both for the decision as to incapacity and for
the decisions he makes while acting on the policy lcve,
D. REPLIES WHICH BELIEVE TiE MATTER SHOULD BE LEFT FOR
FUTURE DETERMINATION
Aikin (11121): "* * * whether a Vice President succeeds to the office
of the President or merely to the dIuties of that office is one of no
great moment. * * * Congress would -be advised to use the
language of article II, section I, clause 6 of the Constitution and
and permit experience to sulply the meaning."
Howe (P36) : "It is far wiser to leave sonic questions unsettled for in
doing so we preserve for later generations tie power to resolve
their own problems inl accordance with their own needs. * * *
I therefore believe .it unwise to seek a present resolution of"
[this question].
E. REPLIES IN WHICH THERE WAS NO ANSWER TO THE QUESTION
Lien (11123-124): (Question not directly answered.]
Peltason (P48-51): [Question not directly answered.]
X. (a) In the erent of a finding of a permanent disability, does the,
language of the Constitution, namdy, "or a lPresident shall, be
elected-" demand the immediate election of a new Pre.sident?
X. (b) If so, would the election be for a 4-yea term or for the unepired
term of the disabled President?
Replies of a majority of those who answered tile questionnaire or
who gave testimony at. hearings were, either specifically or by iiplica-
tion, that the Constitution does not "demand" the inmiediate election
of a new President in the event. of a finding of permanent disability.
One person believed it unwise to seek a resolution of this question.
The remainder of the replies which were analyzed either (lid not answer
the question specifically or did not discuss the subject.
Although no one expressed tihe opinion that an immediate election
was demanded upon the finding of a permanent disability, a number of
persons expressed opinions concerning such an election, ill the event
one was held. The consensus was that the election would be for the
unexpired term of the disabled President.
Sumniaries of replies appeal- below under the following headinlgs:
A. Replies which expressed the view that in the circumstance
described, the Constitution does not "demand" an immediate
election.
B. Reply which expressed the view that it would be unwise to
seek a resolution of the question.
P
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C. Replies in which there was no answer to tile question.
D. Rep lies which expressed views concerning an election, if one
were ll.(
A. IEPLIEA WHICH EXPRESSED TilE VIEW THAT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCE
DESCRIBED, THE CONSTITUTION DOES xO'T "(DEMAND'I AN IMME-
IIATE ELECTION
Bailey (P4): [Question not answered directly. By implication, the
reply would be negative, for Bailey stated his belief that] "a new
election should be called only if less than 2 years of a President's
term had been served."
Brown (1)1): "1 (1o not think an iniediate election is required."
Corwin (PI7): "The clause of section 6 beginning 'and 
the Congress'
(ieals with the situation which exists when there is neith er a
functioning President nor a functioning Vice President. It has
been dealt with in a series of so-called succession acts, the one
now in force having been enacted in 1947."
Crosskey (11 12): "* * * [ think the answer to your 10th question
ought to be (1) that Congress has no power to call an irregular
presidential election in case s of the permanent disablement of
the President only; the constitutional rights of the Vice President
)reclude it; (2) that Congress does have power to call irregular
Pi'rsidontial elections in all cases of the permanent 'inability' (as-
sumiing such a case can properly be found) 'death,' 'resignation,'
or 'renoval,' of both Presi(lent aind Vice President, but is untdei
no absolute duty to (1o so."
Crosske (1199-105): [~o additional comments on the subject were
found-l
Fauiramn (P~21): ' **thle lainguage of the Constitution does not
demianld an immediate election, hut does recognzi (I, power of
Congress to provide for tile choice of a President to fill out the
terIll. * * *"
Felhnan (P26): "I believe tile language of tile Constitution * * *
does not require but only authorizes the imlnlediate election of a
new President." [Fellman vas inclined to tile belief that Ameri-
can ilistitutions are not geared to handle all the rl)Oleis which
a special presidential election would raise.]
Fliiletter (1'29): "* * * it seems that eveii ill thie (ast of a perniamtelit
disability of tle PIesident the Constitution does not call for the
ininiediate election of a new President. There are two reasons
for this. One, that I think the words 'or President shall be
elected.' may 1he interpreted as permissive and. not mandlatory;
amd two, I should think that this whole second part of clause fl
applies only to til, case where there is a disability both of the
President aud Vice Presivdent. Section 3 of Rrtieli, 20 seems to
support thisview.'
[ll-(4 (P32): "lit the event of at findings" Of penualnetIlit disa~bility, this
11rl li'ge would Ilot diemandll the illledliate elect ion of at miew
P'resillent . It has1 not led to anl iiimed i lte election ini tile c(use
of tile death of tile President. * * *"
1 llt (1191 -99): [No additional comnnts on tile subject were foundd]
lolcombe (P,34): "1 do not think the Constitution requires the
inmt'ediatec election of a hew President under Ihe iidicated
I-
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circumstances. My belief is that the Congress has power to
provide by law for this contingency."
Kallenbach (P48): "* * * Congress may, if it chooses, provide for
election of a succeeding officer for tile remainder bf tile regular
Presidential term ill tile event that the succession, by reason of
the death, resignation, or removal of both the President and tile
Vice President, should fall upon any officer named by law to the
lille of succession. * * *"
Kallenbach (1184-91 ): [No additional comments on the subject were
found.]
Peters (11123): "I (to not believe that in the event of a finding of
permanent disability the Constitution demands the immediate
election of a new President. * * *"
Pennock (1'52): "1 (1o not, believe, in the event of tle finding of
permanent disability, the language of the Constitution demands
the immediate election of a new President.'
Sparkman (119): ''Some question exists as to whether an election
should be held to fill tile Office of President upon the determiina-
tion of his disability. I would rather not go into the matter of
whet her Congress shoul providee for such all interim election.
It. is a rather technical point. I believe it highly unlikely that
tile Congress would not seat the Vice President."
Sutherland (P62) : "The Constitution does not provide for an election
to replace the President; in lily opinion. I think the phrase*
refers to the next regular election.'
Sutherland (1179): "Another uticertaint, that was mentioned was
the question of the 4-year term, w ether it continues in ease
of Presidential inability'or whether there should be a new election.
I have no especial wisdom friom heaven on this subject. It seems
to me offland that. tile 4-year term continues to its end without
a special election. If the Vice President takes over, even during
the permanent illness of the President, it seems to me we wait
for another ordinary 4-year election."
13. REPLY WHICH EXPRESSED TiE VtIEW THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE
TO SEEK A RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION
Howe (P36): "It is far wiser to leave some questions settled for
in doing so we )reserve. for later generations the power to resolve
their own problems in accordance with their ow a needs. * * *
I therefore believe it unwise to seek a present resolution of
the * * * 10th question * * *."
C. REPLIES IN WHICH THERE WAS NO ANSWER TO TIlE QUESTION
Aikin (11119-21): [Question not answered specifically.]
lrelinghuysen (11-18--40): [Question was not discussed.]
Mloover (1'35, 111-2): [Question not answ~ered specifically.]
luber (1P36-37): [Quo:stion not answered specifically.]
lyman (1147-60): [Question was not discussed.]
It-ii (11123-24): [Question not answered specifically.]
Krock (1161-68): (Question was not discussed.]
Payne (1112-17): [Question was not discussed.]
Peltason (1P48-51): [Question not answered specifically.]
57
I
58 PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
Pritchett (P52-54) (168-77): [Question not answered specifically.1
[Qvestiou was not discussed at hearing]
Romani (P-54-61): [Question not answered specifically.]
Romani (H40-46): [Question was not discussed at hearing.]
D. REPLIES WHICH EXPRESSED VIEWS CONCERNING AN ELECTION, IF
ONE WERE HELD,
Bailey (P4): "* * * the election should be for the unexpired term of
the disabled President."
Brown (P6): "If [an immediate election] were provided for, it wouldbe preferable to have it for the unexpired term."
Corwin (P17): "The election referred to is undoubtedly the next
regular presidential election, Congress never having been em-
powered to provide for any other."
Crosskey (11112): () * * 3) that, if Congress does call such an
election, the 4-year term provisions seem logically to apply to
such elections, but that perhaps the calling of an election 'for the
unexpired term of the disabled President (or Vice President]'
might be held to be within the discretion of Congress. I see no
way" of answering this last question with any certainty."
Crosskey (1199-105): [No additional comments on the subject were
found.]
Fairman (P21): "* * * the synchronization of Presidential and con-
gressional terms should not be broken."
Fellnan (P26): "But if there should be a special election, I should
think that it would be merely for the unexpired term of the dis-
abled President, for otherwise, the sequence of events upon which
the Constitution operates would be disturbed."
Hart (P32): "Even if Congress provided for a special election * * * it
could not give the person elected a 4-year term; for that would
upset the time schedule clearly intended by the Constitution to
produce a fixed relationship between the terms of Presidents,
Senators, and Representatives." [Any special election would be
to fill out the unexpired term.]
Hart (1191-99): [No additional comments on the subject were found.)
Kaltenbach (P48): " * * I see no constitutional obstacle to his
being chosen for less than full 4-year term for which a President
is elected."
Kallenbach (1184-91): [No additional comments on the subject were
found.]
Peters (11123): "* * * but if it does, the election should be for the
unexpired term of the disabled President."
XI. Does Congress have the authority to enact legislation to resolve any
and all of these questions, or will a constitutional amendment or
amendments be necessary?
The 26 persons who returned replies to the questionnaire and/or who
testified at the hearing made a wide variety of proposals for solving
the problem of presidential disability. Their replies to question XI
depended upon their respective recommendations in large part, qs well
as upon their respective basic ideas as to the nature of the Constitution
and the system of government which it established. In som cases
they stated that amendment was (or was not) necessary for the par-
ticular proposals which they respectively advocated, but they offered
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the opposite judgment with respect to other proposals which they did
not advocate. Nine persons presented proposals which, in their
opinion, required constitutional amendment; fifteen presented pro-
posals which could be made effective without amendment; one pre-
sented a proposal requiring neither amendment nor congressional
action; and in one case the question was not answered. In the classi-
fication below, each person's judgment concerning the proposal which
he supported was the factor determining inclusion in section A, B,
C, or D.
A. Replies expressing belief that proposed plans required con-
stitutional amendment.
B. Replies expressing belief that proposed plans could be car-
ried out by statute, without constitutional amendment.
C. Replies expressing belief that proposed plans required
neither Congressional action nor constitutional amendment.
D. Replies in which this question was not answered.
A. REPLIES EXPRESSING BELIEF THAT PROPOSED PLANS REQUIRED
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
Bailey (P4): "I believe a constitutional amendment would be neces-
sary to enact the above procedure."
Frelinghutysen (1129, 32, 33-35, 38-39): "Has Congress the power to
make provision for the disability of a President? I believe it has.
Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution [the necessary-and-proper
clause] provides [this authority]. FurthJermore, since the Consti-
tution specifically authorizes Congress to take action to name a
successor if both the President and Vice President are not avail-
able-article II, section 1, clause 6-it can be argued that Con-
gress has equal authority to remedy the problem under discus-
sion. * * * The question here, it'seems to me, is one of wisdom
not of law. Is it wise to have Congress alone make the inability
determination? I do not believe it is (1129). * * * In consider-
ing the various proposals to vest the Cabinet with authorityto de-
termine disability it is well to keep in mind the fact that the Cabinet
is not a constitutional branch of the Government. From this
standpoint it should not, perhaps, be given the same status in
your considerations as constitutionally established bodies (H32).
* [Frelinghuysen stated that it w ould be "very undesirable"
to spell out a definition of inability In a constitutional amend-
ment (1133). At 1133-35 and 38-39 is the text of Frelinghuy-
sen's proposed joint resolution for a constitutional amendment,
11. J. Res. 442 of the 84th Congress. The section H-33-39 con-
tains discussion of various constitutional points. In conclusion
(H39) lie stated:] Some persons, in their desire to achieve a
quick solution to the disability problem, have opposed the idea
of a constitutional amendment. They feel that it would take
too long to secure its passage. There is little doubt but that it
would take at least 2 or 3 years before such an amendment could
be passed, although the value of the support which a proposed
amendment probably would receive from President Eisenhower
might shorten this period. The question, however, is essentially
whether the problem could be handled effectively by ordinary
legislation. Ido not believe it could. An effective solution to
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the problem requires the formality of a constitutional amend-
ment. * * I do not contend that the adoption of this proposal
as a constitutional amendment will solve all the problems asso-
ciated with Presidential disability. Nor (1o I think it wise to
attempt to incorporate in a constitutional amendment solutions
to all aspects of the problem. I (1o believe, however, that my
proposal attempts to meet the basic issues which must be
resolved."
liuber (136-37): [This question was not directly anlswered, although
luber stated the general reposition that] "Quite probablyy the
solution of the problem of the incapacitated Presidenit must be
solved by constitutional amement, if a pattern of solution is
desired. Any amendment , however, should first of all consider
tie separation of powers within the Federal Government. This
means, it seems to me, that the decisioll * * * should not be
made either by the judicial or legislative branch of governmentt'
[lie did not state specifically that his proposmi for an adlministra-
tive team consisting of the' President and Vice Presidont. would
require constitutional amendmienit, but, since it would involve
removing the Vice President from his duties as presiding officer
of the Senate, by implication amn amendment would be needed].
Kallenbach (1'48): " * * * I believe that Congress cau, and should,
by law act to resolve some of the doubts am conflsions about
w :hat should le (lone with reference to situations involving
Presileuitial inability. The statute, pIermaulent in character, and
following lies I have suggested, shouhi be directive or declaratory
ill character, and not tanidatory. * * * If Congress desires to
set up a procedure which will be maldatorv, one in which tindiigs
and determinations that are legally binding upon the Oflicers
directly involved can be made, I believe, resort to a constituitional
amendment t would be ntecessary.'
Kallenbach (.1184 and 90--91): "It is my opinion that the Congress can
act on this subject under authority already conlferred by the pro-
visions of article iI aid I)y tle necessary"anld proper clause, and
that it should proceed to (1o so. I lowev-er, there is some uncer-
tainty as to the extent of its authority to imiplement , by statute,
the inability clause. There is also nieed for clarification of the
position of the Vice President ill the various ciriealmstalices tnldei
which Ile may assume the powers alid duties of the presidential
ollice. Comsequeittly, I believe that it would also be advisabl,
for Congress to initiate a constitutional ameinhneit to resoh'.
any (houil)ts that might exist with reference to these aspects of
prsideiitial successioli arrangements. * * * Tile comistitutioiml
anieunlinent which Congress should sibmilit * * * need ]ot be
a lengthy one ]nor should it alter existing provisions and usages
any more than necessary to resolve existing uncertainties. Its
pr)ovisiolhsi ncd not deaf ill detail with the )rocedure for deter-
Presidential inability, but should make clear the author.-
itvot Congress to legislate conchsively on the stilject. It
should also clarify the question of tile status of the succeeding
officer under the various circumstances %0uich can arise.' [At
1190-91 Kallenbach gave the text. of his proposed ameidinient.]
Krock (i12 amid 634) : rockk proposed a complete proceduree. "This
mIodus operandi can and should be provided by an act of CoIn-
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gress, subject, of course, to the usual presidential veto. * * *
No statutory approach is worth making without the full oopera-
tion of tie President. As a practical matter, no constitutional
aicudnient could probably be adopted without this ('oopera-
lion. * * * [Krock stated that] what I suggest as a stopgap
statute with a certain lack of authority, * * * obviously would
be fortified by a constitutional amendment. That would have a
verv binding effect. * * * If a statute to the effect outlined
allbove can le drafted to the satisfaction of Congress an(d the
Executive, it woull be desirable to supplement this with a con-
stitutional amendment to the same effet.'
l1ltason (P50-51): "Congress' right to establish disability stems from
the necessary and proler dluse whicl gives Congress the power
to pass laws ill order to enable tile Vice President to execute his
duties. Although it might he argued that this gives Congress
tle antlo v to provide proeedireto o (letermiie lisahility other
I itin to deciie a particular mn intiheit's disabhilitv. Congress could
act inl two steps. First, it could j rovide thli tit, fact of dis-
atlIilitV is to be established by a joint or conciurrent resoltion of
Con.zress, and tlen rule that the iuicumubent was disabled. Cer-
tainv such a (let erminnat ion wouhd e given great Nveight. * * *
The only tree Sti-ttes [.\lississi,''i, Alah.iama, and New Jeisev]
whiichli ive established .procei es to determine (lisabilitv 11 ae
givell the job to theit:. State st'oreme courts. All have donle so by
(oustitltioliiil ameld liwiit. * * * Oticr Stite (.ou its li1i%,e
a ssmnild respond sibility for estalblishiu lisalbilitv throul IiinI-
in ils (ii t1iie WtlIT IO ' i 'oc([dl ,s. even ili tit l Ti Ce of specific
i.onstit utioual provisions.. Nevertheless, a colustitu tioial amend-
miet wouldI I, ':r ill Ordei to emnro1v ci:O the S Ilireme Court
to act. With t tIll ii if lt tall IlCversaiy proceeding--a
(,1si of count rovers, --would be required to ailie (iestion of
P'rcsii lenitil di'biitv and it is doubtfiil if tile issue could be first
lnoised ill tile Supreme Court. Without an anielndient tile con-
stitut tinllitv of tle piocedlldes n ighi t b, left unresolved mtil it
I ccii me necessa ry to put then to use. Furlitheriore, even if tile
power to decide ri'csidlntial iili bilit " were vested in others beside
tle Supreme Cour't there would be constitutional problems.
[Peltason stated that the powe of Congress to determinee dis-
abilit involved questions which] ('amilot conclusively be answered111til'1a crisis is uponl us, perhaps not 11ntil they ar;ise ill a legal
contoveisv anld are disposed of by the Supre',me Court. * * *
Illence, tan act of Congress would still lea e sone basic constitti-
1ioal (iuestiolis unresolved and mould not decisively clan'if\'
responsibility. Onily a constititionl a Ienldment coul'do these
things."
Priclhett (P52-54): [In his reply lPritchett did not discuss problems of
(onstitutionllity at leiigth. At '52 lie stated that the Supreme
Court (ouhl not be given responsibility without a constitutional
irmenndieit. In discussing temporary devolviug of Presidential
powers on the Vice President, lie stated---] 'The Constitution
(mall reasonablly be interpreted to permit such a temporary (he-
volving of Presidential powers, and Congress would be fully jus-
itfiled Inl passiIig an act asserting such il interpretation 1'1 a n milk-
ing arrangements for facilitating such a temporary transfer.
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There would seem to be almost no chance that the Supreme
Court would question the power of Congress to enact clarifying
legislation A this sort, * * *" [Since Pritchett's draft of pro-
posed legi,lation (P54) was for a congressional statute and not a
constitutional amendment, it may be concluded that he saw no
need for the latter.
Pritchett (H6-70, 72--77): "The most effective method would be a
constitutional amendment. * * * the principles ilVolved here
canl bo stated simply, * * * The amendment would of neces-
sity have to deal with succession for all four of the constitutionally
recognized causes, * * A propose( draft of the amendmnt
follows: * * *
"'Sic. I. In case of the removal of the President from
office, or his death or resignation, the Vice President shall
become President.
" 'SEc. 2. If the. President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of the office, the powers and duties shall devolve
on the Vice President, to be discharged by him until the
President's disability is removed.
'Sc. 3. The Congress may by law provide for the case
of removal, death, resignation, or inability, both of the Presi-
dent and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then
act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until
disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
" 'SEc. 4. Clause 6 of section 1 or article II of the Con-
stitution of the United States is hereby repealed.' " (P69 -
70).
[In discussing the statutory amplification of his amendment
(1170-72) Pritchett summarized his proposals as follows] * * * I
suggest as a possible supplementary step, the adoption of legisla-
tion which will interpret the constitutional provisions oil succes-
sion as meaning (a) that the President can declare his own in-
ability; (b) that in emergencies the Vice President cal declare the
inability of the President, after consulting with the Cabinet;
and (c) that the President can reclaim his powers after a period of
inability by announcing the termination of his inability. (1172)
• * * The suggestions I make * * * are the possibility of
drafting a constitutional amendment which could be introduced
simultaneously [with draft legislation] and which would rest
any possible doubts as [to] the aUthority of Congress to legislate
onthe basic problem of the Vice Presidnt becoming President."(Te counsel, r. Foley, stated, "Your real objective in suggest-
ing the ual approach, I presume, is to use tle, statutory form for
a stopgap until a constitutional amendment is Iadopted.
Pritchett, agreed, and called attention to tle civil rights ill of
1866 and the 14th Amendment as furnishing a similar instance].(1176-77).
Sparkmian (1111-12): [Sparkman approved of Fairmau' s proposal(see Ili above) for anl agepey made up of members of tilme Supreme
Court, acting as a special commission to determine presidential
inability.] "That, (method) might be a problem as far as a simple
act, of Congress is concerned. Ini order to do it' would require a
constitutional amendment."
Sutherlan4( (P62): "1* * * I think that legislation will depend for
its effectiveness onl voluntary acceptance, as any statute pur-
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purting to stop the functioning of a President elected for 4 years
will run into constitutional obstacles."
Sutherland (1177-78): "The problem seems to me to involve a con-
stitutional amendment. * * * The simplest amendment would
authorize the Congress to legislate for the case of Presidential
inability to perform his duties. * * * To turn over provi-sion
for suspending or ending his duties to ordinary legislation would
alter, in an important respect, the present distribution of govern-
mentalpowers between the executive and the legislative branches.
* * * it seems better that, if some new constitutional provision
is to be adopted concerning presidential inability, it. should pro-
vide directly -for some means of determining the existence of
disability andi'l of its termination when that occurs." [At H78
the witness described the contents of such a proposed amendment).
B. REPLIES EXPRESSING BELIEF THAT PROPOSED PLANS COULD BE
CARRIED OUT BY STATUTE, WITHOUT CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
Aikin (14121): "The joint resolution [see III above for Aikin's pro-
posal for enactment, of a joint resolution authorizing Congress
to act by concurrent resolution in case of presidential disability]
upon whiich such a power would be founded would be in itself a
quasi-constitutioiial act. Whether or not it acquired the force
of constitutional authority would depend on the way in which
power granted by it, was exercised and the consequent. acceptance
by the nation of such an exercise of power."
Browni (P6): "In my opinion any and all of the questions raised in
the questionnaire could be settled by legislation."
Corwin (P17): "No constitutional ameillment sees to me to be
required to enable Congress to do anything above suggested for
it to do."
Crosskey (H1i15-119): [In his testimony at the hearing (1199-105) and
in his reply to Pe questionnaire (H105-119) Crosskev dealt ex-
tensively ;vith the constitutional problems of presidential dis-
ability. His reply to question XI is at Hl15-119: excerpts from
it follow below:]
"Whatever powers Congress has it. has under its express power
'to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the * * * Powers vested by the Constitution
in * * * any * * * officers * * * of [the United States].' * * *
In each of these cases [arising under provisions of the presidential
clause], the 'necessary-and-proper' clause vests Congress with
full and express ownerss to make laws to carry this provision into
effect. Apart from limitations growing out of other relevant
provisions of the document, this is a power to do whatever seems
wise and expedient. in the premises. If I am right, however, that
the Constitution provides for the adjudicating of 'cases' under the
'Presidential-inability' clause in the national courts, Congress
cannot constitutionally put this function into any other organ
of government. The language of the categories of 'the judicial
power' in article III is mandatory; * * * The mandatory charac-
ter of these provisions of article III has never * * * been com-
pletely observed. Nevertheless, the principle of the separation
of powers is regarded as fundamental in our Government, and I
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(10 not see how Congress could take the cases ill question away
from the national courts without violating this acknowledged
principle. [Crosskey discussed the objections, on other than
constitutional grounds, to vesting this power in the President,
the Vice President, tile Cabinet, Congress, or an independent
body (li116-117).] * * * The courts, on the other hand, seem
to Ive to be recomeniided in preference to all other possible
agencies by at least two considerations. First, there is their
experience: * * * In addition to their experience, they have
the artificial characteristics that the Federal Convention so
solicitously gave them. They are permanently out of coipeti.
tive jpolitics, and their otices'and salariies le Se(lred to thvm.]
* * * Accordingly, I should not think that Congress ought to
take these cases away from the courts even if I thought that bod\y
possesed of constitlitional power to do so. Dots this meal that
Congress ought not to legislate in the premises at all? By no
means. Congressional legislation, in my judgment , is very
dcsirabh for two distinctt purposes. 'rhe first pII'ioS * * *
is a clarification of the general understanding of the Constitution
as it relates to this whole matter (I1117-1 18). * * * A second
ol)je.t * * * is that of molding the reledy of quo wilrranto. il
the light of our experience ** * so a s to assure that, ill such
cases, inl the fn ture, the intended remedy MRill be used when the
public interest deim ads it (If 118). * * * I suppose nearly
evry'VOne would agree that it would he ap)ropria te and expedient
to put cases iitmu Ier the ldresi ential-inabilit\" clause within the
original jurisdiction of the Suplelle Colrt. * * * [Crosskey
slated that the Court a' igh t be willilig, if offered ti, opportunity,
to overrule earlier decisions wb' ich ma de it i ilossble for, C(ongress
to add to tle Court's original jurilkdi('t ill . Otherwise, if it he
desired to put IPresident ial-iiu iit v s,s within its original
jurisdiction] it will be Iicess'iry to ametd the (onstitution."
Fairmuan (P'20-21): [In his reply to question IV, Flaiiman referred to
tle constitutioal Iilitatio I the Suprenle Court imposed ill
artiie Ill, section 2. clause 2 in which the Court's jurisdiction is
defined. le discussed this inl his reply to qulestioli Ill (RP20).
In his opilioli. to vest the dilty of deteimiining disability in the
Court would require constitutiolll, alientdilent. lie Ielivved
that Congress had IpoNr to establish a special conlinission as
described love ill I1 and I!. Ini his reply to (Iuestioils IX a11( X
(P21) lie stated that it is within Congress' power to provide for
the choice of a new President, ill (eIse both the President and
Vice President are lost, a1(d that the language of tile Constitution
does not demand an immediate election, but does recognize tle
power of Congress to provide for the choice of a President to fill
out the term. LHis reply to question XI was as follows:-.]
''The foregoing discussion lis indicated throughout what can he
done bv statute, and what would require a change ill the Consti-
tution.' The method for determninilg 'hiabilitv' recommended
above [see II and III above] could be provideWd by legislation.
If, however, time more inclusive problem of providing for govern-
mental continuity during ail atomic war is to be considered, then
at some points it will be found that constitutional amiendmllent is
involved. I urge that Presidential succession-and provision for
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the continuity of Congress as well-be viewed ill this larger
perspective." (P21).
Fellman (P26): "I believe that Congress has authority to enact legis-lation on all the questions raised hele under the Constitution asit now stands, and that constitutional amendments are -not
necessary. Such legislation, based upon the language and pur-poses of the relevant constitutional clauses, would be justified by
normal canons of constitutional construction."
Iart (P30): "On this subject the Constitution is not only ambiguous
about what is to happen but, also incomplete in not indicating
who shall decide that it is to happen. But there is no rule of
construction that an ambiguous provision may not be carried
out until it is clarified by amendment. Those \lio operate under
a provision must attribute meaning to it, as best they may.
It must thus be assumed that the framers meant only to laydowl I )rinciples and to leave it to the law to provide the details
a(d procedures. Insofar as Ilmeaning has not been supplied bypractice, it may be supl)lied by Congress in the exercise of itsdelegated power to make all lavs which shall be necessary a,,d
proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by the Con-
stitutioii in the President as ai officer of the Government.
Congress may enact a lermanent statute or it may legislate for
a particular case of inability after it arises. In the latter event
the mental condition of the President might prevelit his acting
upo tile bill; id even"if Congress could have it technically i)re-
scited( to him and assume that it became law after the 10-day
period, circumstances are readily conceivable in which the delay-
of a week andt a half would be ;lat gerous. But Congress miglht
not lhe in session. * * * What if it, that situation the Presidents
mental condition prevented his signing a proclamation to call a
Special session? It does not follow that a permanent law is
absolutely necessary. * * * On the whole, however, it would
seem better to hav an orderly procedure prescribed in advanceby law, if it is one which could be expected to produce a finding
of inability if that were necessary, but not otherwise. * * * [iidiscussing the method of appointmemit by Congress of the Coni-
missioners oil Presideitial Iability, as recommended by I Hart(see Ill above) lie wrote as folloms-] Those commissioners
should not be appointees of the President. Congress should
vest their, appointment in the Suplreme Court of the United
States, under its authority to vest the alpointnent of inferior
officers in teie courts of law. The term 'inferior officers' is not
defined in the Constitution; and within the limits of reason tile
matter is left to Congress. It could so classify commissioners
who would have no power at all except in Special circumstancesto make findings of fact and do other things incidental thereto.
Congress is authorized to vest in the courts of law the appoint-
mcnt of 'such inferior officers, as they think proper.' These
will nmormilly be ihe officers attached" to the courts; but thelanguage is road enough to allow Congress to include others for
appropriate reasons."Hart (1192-95): [hlart repeated and amplified the statement, sum-
marized above, which lie had previously made in his repl- to
the questionnaire. Ile stated that the form of legislation shouldbel " a joint resolution because it is decelaratory of the Constitu-
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tion. * * Congre&S has the express' 0owyer' tb make all: laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
not only ts own enumerated powers but also all other powervested by the Constitution -in any officer of the United ates.
This 6ves a textual basis for its power to act in this'situiation,
though what it. may do when it so ets is limited by other con-
stitutional principles, such as the separation of powers and the
President's independent tenure. It is one thing to argue that
in the absence of a statute it is or may become the power and
duty of the Vice President and Presideint, respectively, to make
the crucial findings of fact. It is quite another thing to deny that
Congress m make Dnandatory an appropriate method of making
such findings. For to claim that it is the absolute power and
duty of these officers to make the pertinent findings is to read
into the Constitution something which is not therein stated and
which is kept from being a necessary inference by noting that
the power of Congress comes within the terms of the 'necessary
and proper' clause. Several assumptions seei proper at this
stage: (1) that this is one of those cases where any arrangement
which is suggested has its drawbacks; (2) that therefore there is
a strong presumption against freezing any plan into the Consti-
tution; (3) that it is in the public interest that there now beprovided a definite method for determining presidential inability
and its removal; (4) that Congress has within limits the power to
provide such a method under the 'necessary and proper' clause-
and (5) that the problem is not solved unless the method adopted
promises satisfactory results in all possible cases of factual dis-
ability. * * * tin discussing Congress' power to provide for a
special body, with members to be appointed by the Supreme
(ourt, to determine inability, Hart discussed the meaning of
article I[, section 2, clause 2, of the Constitution, relating to
the appointment of inferior officers (V194-95). He stated that-1]
the term 'inferior' is not defined, and hence should be liberally
construed. * * * It is submitted that the Constitution may
properly be taken to leave it to Congress to treat any particular
officers as 'inferior,' at least within the limits of 'reason. It
would not be unreasonable fer it to treat aa 'inferior' officers
commissioners whose only function would be to make occasional
findings of fact in two sorts of situations however important the
consequences of such findings might, be. But what interior
offi ers may Congress authorize the courts of law to appoint?
The Constitution says such inferior officers as they think proper.
This leaves it entirely to the discretion of Congress. * * * ft is
suggested that Congress may provide for removal of the com-
missioners for cause on the analogy of United States v. Perkins
(116 U. S. 483), on which see Myers v. United States (272 U. S. 52,
126-127, 159-162 (1926))."
Hlolcombe (P4) "Congress happily possesses a general but limited
authority to enact legislation necessary and proper~ to resolve
any and all of these questions, subject to review by the Supreme
Court of the necessity and propriety of such legislat ion'9 Con-
gress might enact. I (10 not believe that aity constitutional
amendment is necessary in order to perfect the provisions of the
Constitution relating to this matter as they came from the hands
of the framers."
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Hoover (P35), "It Is my uIideitandihigthat under aticle MI, section
I of the 'Consitutioh- "the Cotgiess haa the power to d'tormine
who shall take over Exccutlve*powei'in the'case of the inability
of the President to'sorve." -
Hoover (111-2): 1Question wos notanswered]. '
HoWe (P35-36): lhowe J reomniendedl that ,Congeis act "by joint
resolution or 'statute" and he expressed the opinion that no
statute or resolution was needed to give the, Cabinet the 'right
to initiate congressional action]. 71 believe that'the Congress
possesses today the sole power which it seem to ifte to be desir-
able for it to exercise. That is the power to assert an exclusivW
authority over the matter of a President's 'inability."'
H.yman (1152-54): [Hyman recommended] , first, an explora-
tion of every avenue by which the spelling out of the procedures
to be taken" in the case of Presidential disability could take the
form over a joint 'resolution. - If for one or another reason, certain
vital, and necessary grants of authority cannot be bottomed on
this porous framework, then the committee might, move on to
consider how the spelling out could be accomplished by statute
alone. * * * Only as a last, desperate, back-against-the-wall
resort, would it appear advisable for the committee even to
consider the need for a constitutional amendment. * * * For
all of the foregoing reasons, of the printed draft measures before
your committee, the one that commends itself to me as the work-
ing basis for a solution to the question of disability is the draft
of a joint resolution" (prepared bv the counsel and the staff
director of the committee (text at 154)]. [Hyman stated that
it would be superfluous to spell out in legislation that the Vice
President succeeds only to the powers and duties, and riot to the
office, of President since the question was settled in the wording
of the 20th Amendment. (1153 and 60).
Lien (11123-124): [in his reply Lien did not answer this question.
lie referred to "any law enacted to deal with the 'inability'
problem" and made no reference to constitutional amendment].
Payne (1.12-17): lThis question was not discussed at the hearing. By
implication, Payne did not think constitutional amendment
necessary, since his bill (S. 2763) did not so provide and he stated
that the (uty placed on the Chief Justise in that bi1 was "strictly
ministerial.I"]
Peters (11123): "Clarifying legislation of the nature indicated above
providingg that the Vice President make the determination of
inability: see III above] seems to be clearly within the constitu-
tional authority of Congress. The establishment of special
bodies for the determination of inability and for the removal of
the President would seem to require a constitutional amend-
ment." [Peters did not favor such a body].
Romani (P57-61): (In several parts of his reply Romani indicated h a
views on the constitutionality of different proposals:--Presi-
dential declaration of his own inability (P57), Vice Presidential
declaration (P58), and Presidential declaration of removal of
inability (P59) were all held to be established under present
constitutional provisions. In discussing the proposal that Cow.
gress initiate action and the Supre e Court or an independent
agency make the determination, he replied that it was doubtful
'I
z R zb z1 TiAt3 INA iM'rY
whether Congress, without constitutional amendment, has the
authority to enact such legislation (P59). "Tile suggestion out-
lined here would require no further congressional action if this
line of constitutional interpretation couldreceive general accept-
aice, but because of tie confusion surrounding the problem it
seems advisable to propose the adoption of an amendment
simply to clarify and spell out this reading of the Constitution.
This would not only restore the original intent of the framers but
also set the public's mind at ease." [See draft of proposed amend-
ment at 1160-611.
Romani (1140-43): [Although Romani did not, expressly state that he
had changed his mind on this point, his testimony indicated such
changeJ. "* * * as tile Constitution now sialds * * * tile
Vice President has both tile right and obligation to assume the
powers and duties of the President when the latter is unable to
discharge those powers and ditties. Thie Vice President cannot
escape this responsibility, nor, (loes it, seem, may Congress circuln-
scribe this right of his to act except by constitutional amendment.
* * * [Of tile various proposals before the committee for ('oil-
sideration], I favor the adoption of any of the following: [(1) the
passage of a joint resolution, (2) an inability statute, or (3) a
constitutional amendment containing the same provistois as (t)).
* * * Following tile general line of reasoning that I have slated
• * * I would not think a constitutional anicdment neessiarv.
C. IMPLIES EXPRESSING BELIEF TH.AT PROPOSED PLANS REQUIRED
NEITIEII CONGRESSIONAL ACTION NOR CONSTITUTION.\I AMENDMENTT
Finletter (1"27-29): [In his reply Fieletter made proposals indicating
that icither conI gressional action notr constitutional amendment
was necessary in order to carrV them out. Ile reconumended
against def'tition of "inability' (1127) and inlicatel that, if
definition were attempted, an important constitutional (ltlestiotl
would be raised (1)28). lie did tnot favor giving original juris-
diction to the Supreme Court to determine inability (1 28). lie
raised constitutional objections to granting this authority to
Congress, the Cabinet, an independent agency, or tle inferior
courts, and did not favor their exercise of it (P28). his reply to
question XI was as follows:-] "I think that a constitutional
amendment would be necessary to give original jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court on this subject or to ant lorize the Cotgress to
determine the conditions which would constitute inability of the
President to discharge the powers atld ditties of his office."(P29).
D. IPIAS IN WitiCtI TillS QUESTION WAS NOT ANSWERED
Pennock (1'52): [Question was not answered: see "Pennock" in IV
above for his opinion concerning constitutionality in eoli'ectiol,
with 1i and III . TuE QUESTIONNAIRES:
House of Representatives, United States, Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D. C., 84th Congress, 1st session
U8 PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
QUESTIONNAIRE-PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
I. What was intended by the term "inability" as used in article 2,
section I clause 6, of the Constitution? Shall a definition be enacted
into law? If so will you set forth a workable definition? Shall such
a definition encompass physical and mental disability as well as the
duration thereof?
II. Who shall initiate tile question of the President's inability to
discharge the powers and duties of his office?(a) The Congress.(b) The Vice President.(c) The Cabinet by majority vote.(d) Any other group, including independent agencies.(e) Shall (d) be of a continuing or temporary nature?
III. Once raised, who shall make the determination of inability?
(a) The Congress.
(b) The Vice President.
(c) The Cabinet by majority vote.(d) Any other group, including independent agencies.(e) Shall (d) be of a continuing or temporary nature?
IV. Arc there any constitutional prohibitions relative to questions II
and III?
V. Shall dual authority, both to initiate the question and to deter-
mine the question, be vested in the same body?
VI. Shall the determination of disability sat forth the-(a) Permanent nature of the disability?(b) Temporary nature of the disability?
kc) If temporary, extent of?
VII. If temporary, who raises the question that the disability has
ceased to exist? Once raised, who shall make the determination of
cessation?
VIII. In the event of a finding of temporary disability, (loes the
Vice President succeed to the powers and duties of the office or to the
office itself?
IX. In the event of a finding of permanent disability, does the
Vice President succeed to the powers and duties of the office or to the
office itself?
X. In the event of a finding of a permanent disability, does the
language of the Constitution, namely, "-or a President shall be
elected-" demand the immediate election of a new President?
If so, would the election be for a 4-year term or for the unexpired
term of the disabled President?
XI. Does Congress have the authority to enact legislation to re-
solve any and all of these questions, or will a constitutional amend-
ment or amendments be necessary?
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